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近日，国家外汇管理局承德市中心支局联合承德农业银行深入滦平县伟源矿业有限责任公司开展“送进门带回家”调研活动。 此次调研活动，通过与企业负责人、财务人员座谈交流，详细深入了解了企业经营情况，发展规划、面临困难以及业务需求，并根据企业经营模式和政策需求，向企业介绍解读了跨国公司外汇集中运营、全口径跨境融资和跨境人民币政策，为企业解决当前融资困难提供了新思路。 承德市中心支局、承德农业银行相关人员参加了此次活动。 2019-08-09/hebei/2019/0809/1439.html
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Pan Gongsheng, PBC Deputy Governor and SAFE Administrator Since 1994, especially since July 2005, China has been continuously pushing ahead with the reform of the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism. As a result, the RMB exchange rate has seen its formation and adjustment more and more marketized and its flexibility increasing. At the same time, financial institutions and market participants have become better adapted to RMB exchange rate fluctuations and adjustments, with risk hedging tools more diversified and RMB internationalization making constant progress. Although the US recently designated China as a so-called “currency manipulator”, the continuity and stability of China’s foreign exchange management policies will not be affected. Financial reform will continue to go deeper and financial opening-up will be further expanded. We will follow unswervingly, as always, the path of development with Chinese characteristics. I. The US designation of China as a so-called “currency manipulator”, essentially a political maneuver amid protectionism and unilateralism, will be remembered as a typical case of absurdity in international financial history. On August 5, in violation of common sense and professionalism in world trade and international finance, the US Treasury designated China as a “currency manipulator” for not intervening in Chinese currency devaluation. This move, in total disregard of the fact that the unilateral US tariff hikes prompted by protectionism had caused adjustment across the board on international financial markets, was also inconsistent with the conclusion of the Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States released by the US Treasury this May. It was part of the overall US strategy to trigger and escalate China-US trade frictions, fully demonstrating the lack of transparency and the arbitrariness of US policy assessment as well as the possibility that any price adjustment unwelcomed by the White House on international markets will be willfully attached a political tag of foreign government intervention. Former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers wrote recently that China does not fit the template for a “currency manipulator”, and that the move of the US Treasury labeling China a “currency manipulator” and asking the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to intervene was unjustified, which would surely do grave damage to the credibility of the US government and Treasury. In the newly released report on the annual Article IV consultation with China, the IMF stood by the basic judgement it had held since 2015, reiterating that the RMB exchange rate was broadly in line with China’s economic fundamentals, which is ample proof that the US accusation is groundless and untenable. The short-term adjustments lately seen in the RMB exchange rate were spontaneous reactions of financial markets to the surprise US announcements of unexpected tariffs. Since April 2018, the US has triggered and kept escalating trade frictions with China, which have become the primary influence on short-term movements of the RMB exchange rate. On June 15, 2018, while China-US trade talks were making headway, the US announced abruptly tariff hikes on USD50 billion worth of imports from China, and three days later threatened to impose higher tariffs on an additional USD200 billion of Chinese imports, sending the RMB into dramatic adjustment against the US dollar, with the onshore CNY/USD spot rate posting a monthly fall of 3.4 percent. In December 2018, as trade tensions eased after Chinese and US leaders met during the G20 summit, the RMB resumed the upward trend. In May 2019, however, the US once again raised tariffs unexpectedly on Chinese goods, bringing down the onshore CNY/USD spot rate by 2.4 percent for the month. On August 2, the US further threatened to increase tariffs on the remaining USD300 billion of Chinese goods, leading to sharp fluctuations in the RMB exchange rate. After the start of trading on August 5, the offshore and onshore RMB weakened beyond 7 per US dollar successively. For the two trading days of August 2 and August 5, the onshore CNY/USD spot rate fell by 1.9 percent approximately. All these fluctuations, as we can see, were natural market responses to external impact on the RMB. II. The politicalized and capricious policies of unilateralism and protectionism of the US will be dark clouds over global financial markets. Since 2018, US protectionist measures on trade have triggered severe turmoil in the global financial market, leading to sharp fluctuations and rapid contagion not only in stock market and foreign exchange market, but also in prices of large-category assets. After the US imposed additional 10 percent tariffs on China’s USD200 billion imports in September 2018, the global stock market (MSCI Global Index) plummeted, with the biggest drop of 18.0 percent. After the US twice escalated tariff measures against China in May and August 2019, the biggest falls in the global stock market reached 6.3 percent and 4.4 percent respectively. Gold price has appreciated by 17.0 percent since May 2019, once exceeding USD 1,500 per ounce, which also revealed a sharp rise of global risk aversion. Since April 2018, the most significant weakening of the exchange rates of emerging market currencies recorded 14.8 percent. It’s evident that the unilateralism and capriciousness of the US policies is a major source of the highly intensified shocks in the financial market. Just as Mr. Larry Summers, former US Treasury Secretary, noted that “there is significant risk of a recession since the financial crisis in 2008”. The monetary policy of the FED is critical to the stability of the global financial markets. Nevertheless, the US government continuously imposes pressures on the Fed, seriously threatening the independence and professionalism of its monetary policy. Donald Trump changed the tradition that successive U.S. presidents did not comment publicly on monetary policy, repeatedly expressing dissatisfaction with the Fed’s monetary policy and a strong dollar and even openly threatening to fire current Chairman Jerome Powell, and attempted to influence FED’s decision by nominating new board members. As the 2020 US presidential election approaches, the frequency of Trump’s public comments on the Fed and the USD exchange rate has been on the rise. Since June 2018, he has lashed out at Fed’s policies or the USD exchange rate more than 30 times. In particular, after RMB weakened beyond 7 per US dollar in early August, aside from designating China as a currency manipulator, Trump denounced Fed for its non-action, and demanded for a cut by 100 basis points as soon as possible, implicitly pointing to the issue of USD exchange rate. Recently, four former chairs of Fed have released a joint declaration, stating that although it often occurred that politicians called for looser monetary policies around elections, monetary policies based on current political (rather than economic) needs would lead to worse economic performance in the long run, which could undermine public confidence of the central bank and result in unstable financial markets. They have called for maintaining Fed’s independence, and keeping monetary-policy decisions from short-term political pressures. III. The PBC will further enhance the flexibility of RMB exchange rate in the market oriented reform, and the foreign exchange market will gradually return to the fundamentals after absorbing short-term shocks. Although the RMB exchange rate was hit by trade frictions and the US designated China as a currency manipulator, our established policies of comprehensively deepening reforms and further opening up will not waver. We will continue to implement the managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies, persistently push forward market oriented exchange rate reform, and improve the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism, so as to keep the exchange rate basically stable at a reasonable and equilibrium level. As a responsible big country, China adopted a responsible attitude during the Asian financial crisis and global financial crisis, and made significant contributions to the gradual post-crisis recovery of the world economy. We will remain firmly committed to the previous G20 summits’ commitments including non-adoption of competitive devaluation and no use of the exchange rate as a tool to cope with international trade disputes. The resilience and potential of the Chinese economy provide a solid base for the stability of RMB exchange rate. Despite that the RMB exchange rate will be subject to trade frictions and other external shocks, we judge it will not depreciate in disorder, and the foreign exchange market will eventually return to fundamentals after a brief shock. Firstly, economic performance has been stable and is expected to firm going forward. The fundamentals for sound economic growth over the long term remain unchanged as economic growth is expected to outpace most major economies and the RMB remains a strong currency. According to Bank for International Settlements, from 2005 to June 2019, RMB appreciated by 38 percent in tems of nominal effective exchange rate, and 47 percent in terms of real effective exchange rate, topping all other G20 countries. Though there have been huge uncertainties in recent China-US trade frictions, the marginal effect of US tariffs on China has been declining. Since the beginning of 2019, with favorable fundamentals, the Chinese economy has on the whole maintained stability while making steady progress, and the major macroeconomic indicators have performed within a reasonable range. Achievements have been made in economic structural adjustments, with growth resilience enhanced and macro leverage ratio remaining basically stable. Secondly, cross-border capital flows are generally stable. As China gradually expanded areas of opening up and comprehensively implemented the management model of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list, the domestic business environment has been further improved and foreign direct investment still enjoys great development potential. In recent years, China has continuously promoted high-level opening up of the financial market, and created a favorable policy environment for foreign investors, including those from the US, to allocate more resources to RMB assets. So far, the sizes of Chinese bond market and stock market have been ranking high in the world, but only around 2 percent and 3 percent of the financial assets were held by foreign investors. With Chinese bond market and stock market more widely included in major international indices, given the relatively high yield in the Chinese bond market against the expansion of negative interest rates worldwide, there is still great potential for foreign investment. Thirdly, China’s external debt has been more stable. In recent years, China’s external debt growth is not high compared with its economic size. By end-2018, China’s external debt ratio (outstanding external debts/GDP), debt ratio (outstanding external debts/annual export proceeds in foreign exchange) and debt servicing ratio (external debt principal and interest repayment/annual export proceeds in foreign exchange) stood at 14.4 percent, 74.1 percent and 5.5 percent respectively, far lower than the internationally accepted alarm level. The structure of external debt continued to optimize, as foreign central bank investors continued to increase their holdings of Chinese bonds for medium- to long-term asset allocation. As a result, the proportion of debt securities in outstanding external debt increased continuously from 8 percent at end-2014 to 22 percent at end-2018. Such kind of capital is relatively stable, hence unlikely to be “deleveraged” in times of exchange rate changes. Fourthly, the RMB exchange rate showed more two-way fluctuations, and foreign exchange market entities became more adaptive and rational. Since the “8.11” exchange rate reform, the RMB exchange rate has been more flexible, with its fluctuation ratio approaching that of currencies of major developed economies. The two-way fluctuations of the RMB exchange rate have become regular, and the depreciation pressure has been timely released. At present, individual foreign currency purchases have been more stable, outbound direct investment by enterprises has been more reasonable and orderly, foreign currency stockpiling has been gradually disappearing, and enterprises’ awareness of exchange rate risk management has been further enhanced. IV. The PBC will maintain the continuity and stability of foreign exchange administrative policies, continuously enhance the liberalization and facilitation of cross-border trade and investment, and improve the cross-border capital flow management framework for opening-up at a higher level. The foreign exchange authorities will maintain policy continuity and stability to serve the new pattern of China’s comprehensive opening-up. We will implement the decisions and arrangements of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, and fulfill our responsibilities by seizing the long-term trend while respecting market forces. We will firmly adhere to our commitments to reform and ensure supply of foreign currencies to enterprises and individuals with regular demands, thus supporting import and export, profit distribution, two-way cross-border investment and other production and operation activities of enterprises, as well as meeting individuals’ actual demands of travelling and studying abroad. Current account payments arising from our people’s real needs will remain unaffected. In addition, we will continue to vigorously promote the liberalization and facilitation of cross-border trade and investment, and further carry out pilot facilitation reforms including trade receipt and payment facilitation, electronization of tax filing for trade in services, and delegation of external debt cancellation to banks, with a view to better serve the real economy. We will continue to deepen the reform of “streamlining administration, delegating powers, strengthening regulation and improving services”, optimize the online system of “Internet Plus government services” released by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in June, and foster a more open, fair and convenient business environment. We firmly believe that in the future, China’s foreign exchange administration will adapt to the opening-up in a more open environment; capital account opening-up, two-way opening-up of the financial market and the RMB internationalization will be promoted in a coordinated way at a higher level; and the liberalization and facilitation of cross-border trade and investment will be further advanced. We have the confidence and capability to effectively prevent risks arising out of external shocks, maintain stability of the foreign exchange market, and promote stable and sound development of the financial market and the financial system. (Source: China Financial News) 2019-08-12/en/2019/0812/1545.html
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问：境外公司给境内个人佣金，能入账吗？ 答：如果是经营性的活动，一般应入个人结算账户。同时经常项目项下小额、零星的经营性收入结汇，可以凭有效身份证件在个人年度便利化额度内通过个人储蓄账户办理。 2019-08-19/hainan/2019/0819/1001.html
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国家外汇管理局统计数据显示，2019年7月，银行结汇11068亿元人民币（等值1610亿美元），售汇11491亿元人民币（等值1671亿美元），结售汇逆差423亿元人民币（等值61亿美元）。其中，银行代客结汇10353亿元人民币，售汇10635亿元人民币，结售汇逆差283亿元人民币；银行自身结汇716亿元人民币，售汇856亿元人民币，结售汇逆差140亿元人民币。同期，银行代客远期结汇签约1139亿元人民币，远期售汇签约362亿元人民币，远期净结汇776亿元人民币。截至7月末，远期累计未到期结汇4473亿元人民币，未到期售汇4757亿元人民币，未到期净售汇284亿元人民币；未到期期权Delta净敞口-2265亿元人民币。 2019年1-7月，银行累计结汇71324亿元人民币（等值10493亿美元），累计售汇73995亿元人民币（等值10887亿美元），累计结售汇逆差2671亿元人民币（等值394亿美元）。其中，银行代客累计结汇66518亿元人民币，累计售汇68486亿元人民币，累计结售汇逆差1968亿元人民币；银行自身累计结汇4806亿元人民币，累计售汇5509亿元人民币，累计结售汇逆差703亿元人民币。同期，银行代客累计远期结汇签约8871亿元人民币，累计远期售汇签约2829亿元人民币，累计远期净结汇6042亿元人民币。 2019年7月，银行代客涉外收入20504亿元人民币（等值2982亿美元），对外付款20647亿元人民币（等值3003亿美元），涉外收付款逆差143亿元人民币（等值21亿美元）。 2019年1-7月，银行代客涉外收入138455亿元人民币（等值20376亿美元），对外付款136489亿元人民币（等值20084亿美元），涉外收付款顺差1966亿元人民币（等值292亿美元）。 附：名词解释和相关说明 国际收支是指我国居民与非居民间发生的一切经济交易，包括引起居民和非居民间资产和负债变化的所有金融交易和实物交易。 银行结售汇是指银行为客户及其自身办理的结汇和售汇业务，包括远期结售汇履约和期权行权数据，不包括银行间外汇市场交易数据。银行结售汇统计时点为人民币与外汇兑换行为发生时。其中，结汇是指外汇所有者将外汇卖给外汇指定银行，售汇是指外汇指定银行将外汇卖给外汇使用者。结售汇差额是结汇与售汇的轧差数。银行结售汇形成的差额将通过银行在银行间外汇市场买卖平盘，是引起我国外汇储备变化的主要来源之一，但其不等于同期外汇储备的增减额。 银行结售汇不按居民与非居民交易的原则进行统计，且其仅包括银行与客户及其自身之间发生的本外币买卖，即人民币和外汇的兑换交易，不同于国际收支交易的统计范围。 远期结售汇签约是指银行与客户协商签订远期结汇（售汇）合同，约定将来办理结汇（售汇）的外汇币种、金额、汇率和期限；到期外汇收入（支出）发生时，即按照远期结汇（售汇）合同订明的币种、金额、汇率办理结汇（售汇）。远期结售汇业务使得企业可提前锁定未来结汇或售汇的汇率，从而有效规避人民币汇率变动的风险。银行一般会通过银行间外汇市场来对冲远期结售汇业务形成的风险敞口。比如，当银行签订的远期结汇大于远期售汇时，银行一般会将同等金额的外汇提前在银行间外汇市场卖出，反之亦然。因而远期结售汇也是影响我国外汇储备变化的一个因素。 远期结售汇平仓是指客户因真实需求背景发生变更、无法履行资金交割义务，对原交易反向平盘，了结部分或全部远期头寸的行为。 远期结售汇展期是指客户因真实需求背景发生变更，调整原交易交割时间的行为。 本期末远期结售汇累计未到期额是指银行与客户签订的远期结汇和售汇合同在本期末仍未到期的余额；差额是指未到期远期结汇和售汇余额之差。签约额与累计未到期额之间的关系为：本期末远期结售汇累计未到期额=上期末远期结售汇累计未到期额+本期远期结售汇签约额-本期远期结售汇履约额-本期远期结售汇平仓额。 未到期期权Delta净敞口是指银行对客户办理的期权业务在本期末累计未到期合约所隐含的即期汇率风险敞口。银行为管理这部分风险敞口，在期权合约存续期间通常会在外汇市场进行对冲。 银行代客涉外收付款是指境内非银行居民机构和个人（统称非银行部门）通过境内银行与非居民机构和个人之间发生的收付款，不包括现钞收付和银行自身涉外收付款。具体包括：非银行部门和非居民之间通过境内银行发生的跨境收付款（包括外汇和人民币），以及非银行部门和非居民之间通过境内银行发生的境内收付款（暂不包括境内居民个人与境内非居民个人之间发生的人民币收付款），统计时点为客户在境内银行办理涉外收付款时。其中，银行代客涉外收入是指非银行部门通过境内银行从非居民收入的款项，银行代客对外支出是指非银行部门通过境内银行向非居民支付的款项。 银行代客涉外收付款是国际收支统计的组成部分，但其统计原则与国际收支采用的权责发生制原则不同，采用资金收付制原则，且其仅反映境内非银行部门与非居民之间的资金流动状况，不能反映实物交易和银行自身的涉外交易，统计范围小于国际收支统计。 2019-08-19/safe/2019/0819/13882.html
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日前，国家外汇管理局公布了2019年7月份银行结售汇和银行代客涉外收付款数据。国家外汇管理局新闻发言人、总经济师王春英就2019年7月份外汇收支形势回答了记者提问。 问：2019年7月份我国外汇收支形势有何特点？近期有什么变化？ 答：7月银行结售汇和涉外收支更趋平衡，外汇市场运行保持稳定。一是银行结售汇逆差明显收窄。7月，银行结售汇逆差61亿美元，环比减少68%。综合考虑远期结售汇和期权交易等其他供求因素，外汇市场供求基本平衡。二是非银行部门涉外收支基本平衡。7月，企业、个人等非银行部门涉外收支小幅逆差21亿美元，6月为逆差91亿美元。 外汇市场预期平稳，主要渠道的跨境资金流动状况稳中向好。一方面，市场主体结汇意愿上升、购汇意愿减弱。7月，衡量结汇意愿的结汇率，也就是客户向银行卖出外汇与客户涉外外汇收入之比为67%，环比上升5个百分点；衡量购汇意愿的售汇率，也就是客户从银行买汇与客户涉外外汇支出之比为69%，环比下降1个百分点。另一方面，企业货物贸易、直接投资等项下跨境资金持续净流入且有所增加，个人购汇更加平稳。7月，货物贸易涉外收支和结售汇顺差均环比扩大，直接投资、证券投资涉外收支和结售汇呈现稳定规模的顺差，个人购汇同比下降8%。 8月以来我国外汇市场秩序保持良好。8月初，美国超预期宣布关税措施，全球金融市场反应剧烈，人民币汇率也出现短期调整。从我国企业、个人等市场主体的涉外交易看，8月以来银行结售汇呈现小幅顺差，跨境收支保持基本平衡。这充分体现了国内经济基本面对外汇市场稳定的支撑作用，说明我国外汇市场更加成熟理性，可以更好地吸收、适应外部环境变化。我们将继续保持外汇管理政策的连续性、稳定性，不断提高跨境贸易投资自由化便利化水平，进一步夯实外汇市场平稳运行的基础，服务实体经济发展和国家全面对外开放新格局。 2019-08-19/safe/2019/0819/13881.html
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2019年二季度，境外投资者对我国境内金融机构直接投资流入315.63亿元，流出214.28亿元，净流入101.34亿元；我国境内金融机构对境外直接投资流出338.61亿元，流入263.52亿元，净流出75.08亿元（见表1）。 按美元计值，2019年二季度，境外投资者对我国境内金融机构直接投资流入46.32亿美元，流出31.45亿美元，净流入14.87亿美元；我国境内金融机构对境外直接投资流出49.69亿美元，流入38.68亿美元，净流出11.02亿美元（见表2）。 表1：金融机构直接投资流量表（季度） 单位：亿元 项目 2019年二季度 来华直接投资净流动 101.34 流入 315.63 流出 214.28 对外直接投资净流动 -75.08 流入 263.52 流出 338.61 注： 1.本表计数采用四舍五入原则。 2. 季度流量人民币值通过当季流量美元值折算而成，折算率采用人民币对美元中间价季度平均值。 3.净流动为流入减流出差额，正值代表净流入，负值代表净流出。 表2：金融机构直接投资流量表（季度） 单位：亿美元 项目 2019年二季度 来华直接投资净流动 14.87 流入 46.32 流出 31.45 对外直接投资净流动 -11.02 流入 38.68 流出 49.69 注：1.本表计数采用四舍五入原则。 2.净流动为流入减流出差额，正值代表净流入，负值代表净流出。 附：名词解释 金融机构包括在我国境内依法成立的从事银行业、证券业、保险业及其他金融业务的机构总部及分支机构。 金融机构直接投资是指境外投资者对我国境内金融机构或我国境内金融机构对境外企业进行股权或债权投资，且相关股权投资使直接投资者在直接投资企业中拥有10%或以上的表决权。 金融机构直接投资流量表统计境内金融机构对外直接投资和来华直接投资的股权或债权投资流量数据情况（不含收益再投资）。其中：来华直接投资流入是指境外投资者对我国境内金融机构投入或新增的股权或债权投资，流出是指境外投资者从我国境内金融机构减少或撤出的股权或债权投资；对外直接投资资金流出是指我国境内金融机构对境外企业投入或新增的股权或债权投资，流入是指我国境内金融机构从境外企业减少或撤出的股权或债权投资。 2019-08-19/shenzhen/2019/0819/536.html
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问：有绿卡的人需要国际收支申报吗？ 答：需要，有绿卡的人视为非居民。根据《国际收支统计申报办法》第二条：国际收支统计申报范围为中国居民与非居民之间发生的一切经济交易及中国居民对外金融资产负债情况。 2019-08-19/hainan/2019/0819/1003.html
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问：境内非居民可以接收境外证券公司汇入款项吗？ 答：境外个人收结汇审核其人民币用途而非外汇来源，因此与其款项来源是否为资本项目无关。需了解具体情况才能分析判定。 2019-08-19/hainan/2019/0819/1002.html
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2019年二季度，我国经常账户顺差3885亿元，其中，货物贸易顺差8731亿元，服务贸易逆差4486亿元，初次收入逆差583亿元，二次收入顺差223亿元；资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差483亿元。 2019年上半年，我国经常账户顺差7192亿元，其中，货物贸易顺差15119亿元，服务贸易逆差8766亿元，初次收入顺差471亿元，二次收入顺差369亿元；资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差2274亿元。 按美元计值，2019年二季度，我国经常账户顺差570亿美元，其中，货物贸易顺差1281亿美元，服务贸易逆差658亿美元，初次收入逆差86亿美元，二次收入顺差33亿美元。资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差71亿美元。 按美元计值，2019年上半年，我国经常账户顺差1060亿美元，其中，货物贸易顺差2228亿美元，服务贸易逆差1293亿美元，初次收入顺差71亿美元，二次收入顺差54亿美元。资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差336亿美元。 按SDR计值，2019年二季度，我国经常账户顺差412亿SDR，其中，货物贸易顺差925亿美元，服务贸易逆差475亿美元，初次收入逆差62亿美元，二次收入顺差24亿美元。资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差51亿美元。 按SDR计值，2019年上半年，我国经常账户顺差764亿SDR，其中，货物贸易顺差1605亿SDR，服务贸易逆差931亿SDR，资本和金融账户中，直接投资顺差242亿SDR。（完） 中国国际收支平衡表（初步数） 单位：亿元 项 目 行次 2019年二季度 2019年上半年 1. 经常账户 1 3,885 7,192 贷方 2 50,450 95,854 借方 3 -46,564 -88,662 1.A 货物和服务 4 4,245 6,352 贷方 5 45,563 86,034 借方 6 -41,318 -79,682 1.A.a 货物 7 8,731 15,119 贷方 8 41,532 77,994 借方 9 -32,801 -62,876 1.A.b 服务 10 -4,486 -8,766 贷方 11 4,030 8,040 借方 12 -8,516 -16,806 1.A.b.1 加工服务 13 256 526 贷方 14 261 536 借方 15 -5 -10 1.A.b.2 维护和维修服务 16 127 299 贷方 17 195 407 借方 18 -69 -107 1.A.b.3 运输 19 -1,026 -1,868 贷方 20 754 1,499 借方 21 -1,780 -3,368 1.A.b.4 旅行 22 -3,595 -7,481 贷方 23 623 1,166 借方 24 -4,219 -8,647 1.A.b.5 建设 25 124 169 贷方 26 241 476 借方 27 -117 -307 1.A.b.6 保险和养老金服务 28 -107 -221 贷方 29 76 138 借方 30 -183 -359 1.A.b.7 金融服务 31 30 48 贷方 32 72 127 借方 33 -42 -79 1.A.b.8 知识产权使用费 34 -542 -959 贷方 35 107 232 借方 36 -649 -1,191 1.A.b.9 电信、计算机和信息服务 37 103 212 贷方 38 580 1,095 借方 39 -478 -883 1.A.b.10 其他商业服务 40 215 669 贷方 41 1,075 2,276 借方 42 -860 -1,607 1.A.b.11 个人、文化和娱乐服务 43 -51 -98 贷方 44 17 31 借方 45 -68 -129 1.A.b.12 别处未提及的政府服务 46 -19 -63 贷方 47 27 56 借方 48 -46 -119 1.B 初次收入 49 -583 471 贷方 50 4,419 8,943 借方 51 -5,002 -8,472 1.C 二次收入 52 223 369 贷方 53 468 877 借方 54 -245 -508 2. 资本和金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 55 -3,885 -1,271 2.1 资本账户 56 -4 -6 贷方 57 2 8 借方 58 -6 -14 2.2 金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 59 -3,881 -1,265 2.2.1 非储备性质的金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 60 -4,400 -1,108 其中：2.2.1.1 直接投资 61 483 2,274 2.2.1.1.1 直接投资资产 62 -1,748 -3,167 2.2.1.1.2直接投资负债 63 2,231 5,441 2.2.2 储备资产 64 519 -157 2.2.2.1 货币黄金 65 0 0 2.2.2.2 特别提款权 66 -5 -9 2.2.2.3 在国际货币基金组织的储备头寸 67 13 16 2.2.2.4 外汇储备 68 511 -165 2.2.2.5 其他储备 69 0 0 3. 净误差与遗漏 70 / -5,921 注：1.根据《国际收支和国际投资头寸手册》（第六版）编制。 2.“贷方”按正值列示，“借方”按负值列示，差额等于“贷方”加上“借方”。本表除标注“贷方”和“借方”的项目外，其他项目均指差额。 3.以人民币计值的国际收支平衡表的折算方法为，当季以美元计值的国际收支平衡表，通过当季人民币对美元季平均汇率中间价折算。 4. 2019年上半年初步数为一季度平衡表正式数与二季度平衡表初步数累加得到。 5.本表计数采用四舍五入原则。 中国国际收支平衡表（初步数） 单位：亿美元 项 目 行次 2019年二季度 2019年上半年 1. 经常账户 1 570 1,060 贷方 2 7,404 14,134 借方 3 -6,834 -13,074 1.A 货物和服务 4 623 935 贷方 5 6,687 12,686 借方 6 -6,064 -11,750 1.A.a 货物 7 1,281 2,228 贷方 8 6,095 11,500 借方 9 -4,814 -9,272 1.A.b 服务 10 -658 -1,293 贷方 11 592 1,186 借方 12 -1,250 -2,479 1.A.b.1 加工服务 13 38 78 贷方 14 38 79 借方 15 -1 -1 1.A.b.2 维护和维修服务 16 19 44 贷方 17 29 60 借方 18 -10 -16 1.A.b.3 运输 19 -151 -275 贷方 20 111 221 借方 21 -261 -497 1.A.b.4 旅行 22 -528 -1,104 贷方 23 92 172 借方 24 -619 -1,275 1.A.b.5 建设 25 18 25 贷方 26 35 70 借方 27 -17 -45 1.A.b.6 保险和养老金服务 28 -16 -33 贷方 29 11 20 借方 30 -27 -53 1.A.b.7 金融服务 31 4 7 贷方 32 11 19 借方 33 -6 -12 1.A.b.8 知识产权使用费 34 -80 -141 贷方 35 16 34 借方 36 -95 -176 1.A.b.9 电信、计算机和信息服务 37 15 31 贷方 38 85 161 借方 39 -70 -130 1.A.b.10 其他商业服务 40 32 99 贷方 41 158 336 借方 42 -126 -237 1.A.b.11 个人、文化和娱乐服务 43 -8 -14 贷方 44 2 5 借方 45 -10 -19 1.A.b.12 别处未提及的政府服务 46 -3 -9 贷方 47 4 8 借方 48 -7 -18 1.B 初次收入 49 -86 71 贷方 50 649 1,319 借方 51 -734 -1,248 1.C 二次收入 52 33 54 贷方 53 69 129 借方 54 -36 -75 2. 资本和金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 55 -570 -183 2.1 资本账户 56 -1 -1 贷方 57 0 1 借方 58 -1 -2 2.2 金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 59 -570 -182 2.2.1 非储备性质的金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 60 -646 -158 其中：2.2.2.1 直接投资 61 71 336 2.2.2.1.1 直接投资资产 62 -256 -467 2.2.2.1.2直接投资负债 63 327 803 2.2.2 储备资产 64 76 -24 2.2.2.1 货币黄金 65 0 0 2.2.2.2 特别提款权 66 -1 -1 2.2.2.3 在国际货币基金组织的储备头寸 67 2 2 2.2.2.4 外汇储备 68 75 -25 2.2.2.5 其他储备 69 0 0 3. 净误差与遗漏 70 / -878 注：1.根据《国际收支和国际投资头寸手册》（第六版）编制。 2.“贷方”按正值列示，“借方”按负值列示，差额等于“贷方”加上“借方”。本表除标注“贷方”和“借方”的项目外，其他项目均指差额。 3.2019年上半年初步数为一季度平衡表正式数与二季度平衡表初步数累加得到。 4.本表计数采用四舍五入原则。 中国国际收支平衡表（初步数） 单位：亿SDR 项 目 行次 2019年二季度 2019年上半年 1. 经常账户 1 412 764 贷方 2 5,347 10,180 借方 3 -4,935 -9,416 1.A 货物和服务 4 450 674 贷方 5 4,829 9,137 借方 6 -4,379 -8,463 1.A.a 货物 7 925 1,605 贷方 8 4,402 8,283 借方 9 -3,476 -6,678 1.A.b 服务 10 -475 -931 贷方 11 427 854 借方 12 -903 -1,785 1.A.b.1 加工服务 13 27 56 贷方 14 28 57 借方 15 -1 -1 1.A.b.2 维护和维修服务 16 13 32 贷方 17 21 43 借方 18 -7 -11 1.A.b.3 运输 19 -109 -198 贷方 20 80 159 借方 21 -189 -358 1.A.b.4 旅行 22 -381 -795 贷方 23 66 124 借方 24 -447 -918 1.A.b.5 建设 25 13 18 贷方 26 26 51 借方 27 -12 -33 1.A.b.6 保险和养老金服务 28 -11 -24 贷方 29 8 15 借方 30 -19 -38 1.A.b.7 金融服务 31 3 5 贷方 32 8 14 借方 33 -4 -8 1.A.b.8 知识产权使用费 34 -57 -102 贷方 35 11 25 借方 36 -69 -126 1.A.b.9 电信、计算机和信息服务 37 11 22 贷方 38 62 116 借方 39 -51 -94 1.A.b.10 其他商业服务 40 23 71 贷方 41 114 242 借方 42 -91 -171 1.A.b.11 个人、文化和娱乐服务 43 -5 -10 贷方 44 2 3 借方 45 -7 -14 1.A.b.12 别处未提及的政府服务 46 -2 -7 贷方 47 3 6 借方 48 -5 -13 1.B 初次收入 49 -62 50 贷方 50 468 950 借方 51 -530 -900 1.C 二次收入 52 24 39 贷方 53 50 93 借方 54 -26 -54 2. 资本和金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 55 -412 -133 2.1 资本账户 56 0 -1 贷方 57 0 1 借方 58 -1 -1 2.2 金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 59 -411 -133 2.2.1 非储备性质的金融账户+当季净误差与遗漏 60 -466 -116 其中：2.2.2.1 直接投资 61 51 242 2.2.2.1.1 直接投资资产 62 -185 -336 2.2.2.1.2直接投资负债 63 236 578 2.2.2 储备资产 64 55 -17 2.2.2.1 货币黄金 65 0 0 2.2.2.2 特别提款权 66 -1 -1 2.2.2.3 在国际货币基金组织的储备头寸 67 1 2 2.2.2.4 外汇储备 68 54 -18 2.2.2.5 其他储备 69 0 0 3. 净误差与遗漏 70 / -630 注：1.根据《国际收支和国际投资头寸手册》（第六版）编制。 2.“贷方”按正值列示，“借方”按负值列示，差额等于“贷方”加上“借方”。本表除标注“贷方”和“借方”的项目外，其他项目均指差额。 3.季度SDR计值的国际收支平衡表数据，由当季以美元计值的国际收支平衡表，通过当季SDR对美元季平均汇率折算得到。 4.2019年上半年初步数为一季度平衡表正式数与二季度平衡表初步数累加得到。 5.本表计数采用四舍五入原则。 2019-08-14/anhui/2019/0814/1304.html
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北京时间8月6日，美国财政部将中国列为“汇率操纵国”，中方对此深表遗憾。这一标签不符合美财政部自己制订的所谓“汇率操纵国”的量化标准，是任性的单边主义和保护主义行为，严重破坏国际规则，将对全球经济金融产生重大影响。 中国实施的是以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度，在机制上人民币汇率就是由市场供求决定的，不存在“汇率操纵”的问题。今年8月以来，人民币汇率出现一定幅度贬值，主要是全球经济形势变化和贸易摩擦加剧背景下市场供求和国际汇市波动的反映，是由市场力量推动和决定的。人民银行一直以来致力于维护人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上基本稳定，这一努力在国际社会众所周知。根据国际清算银行公布的数据，2005年初至2019年6月，人民币名义有效汇率升值38%，实际有效汇率升值47%，是二十国集团经济体中最强势的货币，在全球范围内也是升值幅度最大的货币之一。在刚刚结束的国际货币基金组织对中国的第四条款磋商中，国际货币基金组织指出人民币汇率大体符合基本面。在1997年亚洲金融危机和2008年全球金融危机中，中国一直承诺人民币汇率保持稳定，有力地支持了国际金融市场稳定和全球经济复苏。2018年以来，美国不断升级贸易争端，中国始终坚持不搞竞争性贬值，中国没有也不会将汇率作为工具来应对贸易争端。 美方不顾事实，无理给中国贴上“汇率操纵国”的标签，是损人又害己的行为，中方对此坚决反对。这不仅会严重破坏国际金融秩序，引发金融市场动荡，还将大大阻碍国际贸易和全球经济复苏，最终会自食其果。美国这一单边主义行为还破坏了全球关于汇率问题的多边共识，会对国际货币体系的稳定运行产生严重的负面影响。中方奉劝美方悬崖勒马、迷途知返，回到理性和客观的正确轨道上来。 中国将继续坚持以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度，保持人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上的基本稳定。（完） 2019-08-14/anhui/2019/0814/1305.html