-
Distinguished Party Secretary Chen Jining, Former PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, Mayor Gong Zheng, Deputy Director Wang Jiang, Minister Li Yunze, Chairman Wu Qing, Vice Minister Hu Haifeng, Administrator Zhu Hexin, and dear guests, Good morning! I would like to thank Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, especially Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng. Thank you for your care and support for the financial work and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). It is a great honor for me to be the co-chairperson of this year’s Lujiazui Forum. After years of efforts, the Forum has grown into a communication platform with significant global influence and wide market reach. On behalf of the PBOC and other hosts, I would like to express warm welcome and sincere gratitude to everyone. At last year’s Forum, I discussed China’s monetary policy stance and the evolution of monetary policy framework down the road. Over the past year, the PBOC has adopted an accommodative monetary policy stance and rolled out multiple monetary policy measures. The aggregate and structural policy tools have effectively supported the sustained economic recovery and financial market stability. At the same time, we have improved the monetary policy framework, optimized the intermediate monetary policy variables, cultivated policy rates, enhanced monetary policy transmission efficiency, diversified monetary policy toolkit, and strengthened policy communication and expectation guidance. The transformation of monetary policy framework is a gradual and ongoing process, and we will continue to conduct assessments and make refinements in the future. Now, I would like to share with you my observations on global financial governance. This is a very broad topic. So I will focus on four issues: international monetary system, cross-border payment system, global financial stability system, and the governance of international financial organizations. I. On the International Monetary System Throughout history, the international monetary system has never stopped evolving. The replacement of global dominant currencies reflects the profound change in the international landscape and the iteration of national competitiveness. In the 17th century, the Dutch Guilder became the early international currency. From the late 18th century to the first half of the 20th century, the British pound was the dominant currency globally. After the World War II, the U.S. dollar established its dominance and has retained its status up till now. As a global public good, the international currency, if dominated by the sovereign currency of a single country, has inherent instabilities. First, a sovereign currency issuer tends to prioritize its own interests over the supply of global public goods when its own interests conflict with the attribute as a global public good. Second, fiscal and financial regulatory issues of a sovereign currency issuer and the accumulation of structural problems in its domestic economy may generate financial risks with spillover effects, or even escalate into a global financial crisis. Third, in times of geopolitical tensions, national security concerns, or even wars, the global dominant currency tends to be instrumentalized or weaponized. The above problems have driven growing global discussions on the reform of international monetary system. Over the past decade, the driving forces behind the shifts in the international monetary system stemmed primarily from the economic and financial dimensions in the wake of the global financial crisis, and hence the discussions were centered on economic and financial developments. The discussions this time around, however, are mainly driven by geopolitical issues. Broadly speaking, there are two lines of argument. The first one is on how to weaken the excessive reliance on a single sovereign currency and its negative impacts, foster healthy competition among a few strong sovereign currencies, and put in place incentive-restraint mechanisms. A multipolar international monetary system can prompt sovereign currency issuers to strengthen policy constraints, enhance the resilience of international monetary system, and more effectively safeguard global economic and financial stability. Madam Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), noted in her recent speech that the global order based on multilateral cooperation is fracturing, with uncertainty about the dominant role of the U.S. dollar, and the changing landscape could open the door for the euro to play a greater international role. Over the past two decades, the evolution of international monetary system had two key features. The first was the creation of the euro in 1999. The euro now accounts for around 20 percent of global foreign exchange reserves, second only to the U.S. dollar. The second was the steady rise of the RMB’s international status after the global financial crisis in 2008. The RMB has already become the world’s second largest trade finance currency. Calculated on a comprehensive basis, the RMB has become the world’s third largest payment currency. Besides, the weight of the RMB in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) currency basket ranks third. Going forward, the international monetary system is likely to continue its evolution towards a system where a few sovereign currencies coexist and compete with checks and balances. Be it a single sovereign currency or a small group of sovereign currencies serving as the global dominant currency, the sovereign currency issuers should assume their responsibilities by strengthening domestic fiscal discipline and financial regulation, and advancing the structural reform of the economy. The second line of argument is on a super-sovereign currency serving as the global dominant currency, and discussions have been largely focused on SDRs. Dr. Zhou Xiaochuan, former governor of the PBOC, once raised this issue in 2009. Theoretically, SDRs can effectively overcome the inherent problems of a single sovereign currency as the global dominant currency. It offers greater stability in currency value and is better positioned to function as a global public good, as it can help manage global liquidity and facilitate crisis response. The SDR has the attributes of a super-sovereign currency. Having said that, we still lack political consensus and will globally, if the SDR were to become a global dominant currency. Moreover, insufficient market scale, depth and liquidity have limited the role of SDRs. Turning SDRs into a global dominant currency requires member countries to build political consensus, which is not easy, given the current international landscape. Optimizing operational arrangements is also needed to gradually expand the usage of SDRs. In terms of allocation and issuance mechanisms, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issues SDRs mainly as part of crisis response and mostly in the form of a large one-off allocation. In the future, the IMF can issue SDRs regularly and expand the size of issuance. Regarding the scope of use, we need to encourage private sector and market entities to use SDRs in international trade, investment and financing, and to issue SDR-denominated bonds. We need to enhance the role of SDRs as a reserve asset, and establish the SDR settlement mechanism adaptable to large-scale usage. II. On the Cross-Border Payment System The cross-border payment system serves as the artery of global funds flow. It is a keystone for facilitating international trade, investment and financing, and for safeguarding financial stability. It is also a vital pillar of the international monetary system. The evolution of the international monetary system towards coexistence of a few sovereign currencies and booming digital technologies will promote the diversification of the cross-border payment system, which will, in turn, accelerate the shifts in the international monetary system. In recent years, problems faced by the traditional cross-border payment system have loomed large. First, there is a generational differences between traditional cross-border payments and emerging digital technologies. Problems of low efficiency, high costs, and poor penetration demand urgent resolution. Second, cross-border payments require coordination among different legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as among different stakeholders. Therefore, we need to enhance international cooperation. G20 and other international organizations attach great importance to promoting cross-border payments, and formulated a roadmap to enhance cross-border payments. Third, the geopolitical rivalry has escalated. The traditional cross-border payment infrastructures can be easily politicized, weaponized, and used as unilateral sanction instruments, thus undermining the international economic and financial order. Against this background, there have been growing calls for improving the cross-border payment system. New payment infrastructures and settlement methods are continuously emerging, driving the global cross-border payment system onto a more efficient, secure, inclusive and diverse trajectory. This trend will continue to strengthen. First, the cross-border payment system has become more diversified. In terms of currency usage, an increasing number of countries and regions are using local currencies for settlement, promoting the international use of a broader range of currencies. Cross-border payments dominated by a single sovereign currency are undergoing gradual changes. As for payment channels, the rise of new cross-border payment systems and regional multilateral payment systems, along with the traditional correspondent bank model, has diversified settlement channels and further improved the efficiency of cross-border payments. After over a decade of construction and development, China has basically established a cross-border RMB payment and clearing network featuring multiple channels and wide coverage. Second, the interoperability of payment systems and payment ecosystems continues to improve. More countries and regions have extended the operating hours of their payment systems, adopted internationally standardized messaging formats, and promoted the interconnection of fast payment systems. These efforts have enhanced the efficiency of cross-border payments and reduced transaction costs. Countries and regions exemplified by Asia have made substantial progress in enhancing the interoperability of retail payment ecosystems through the interconnection of QR code payments, greatly facilitating cross-border payments by their residents. Third, new technologies are used in cross-border payments at a faster pace. Underpinned by new technologies such as blockchain and distributed ledger, central bank digital currencies and stablecoins are thriving, making possible the simultaneous processing of payment and settlement. The development has fundamentally reshaped the traditional payment landscape, and significantly shortened the cross-border payment chain. It, however, has also posed great challenges to financial regulation. Technologies, such as smart contracts and decentralized finance, will further promote the evolution and development of cross-border payment systems. III. On the Global Financial Stability System Before the 2008 financial crisis, the international community mainly relied on IMF, which is at the center of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), for crisis response during and after crisis. After the 2008 financial crisis, ex ante prevention mechanisms such as financial regulatory rules were further strengthened. On the one hand, the multi-layer financial safety net has continued to improve. I gave a speech on strengthening the financial safety net at the Boao Forum for Asia in March last year. At the global level, in recent years, the IMF has continuously enhanced its crisis response capabilities in times of crisis, strengthened its policy surveillance functions, and expanded the scope of policy surveillance. At the regional level, the European Financial Stability Facility, the Latin American Reserve Fund, the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia, and the Arab Monetary Fund have been established successively, serving as important supports for financial stability in their respective regions. At the bilateral level, central banks in the major advanced economies such as the U.S. Federal Reserve and the ECB have injected liquidity into the markets during crisis through currency swap arrangements. The local currency swap cooperation among emerging markets has also progressed steadily. The PBOC has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in over 30 countries and regions. These swap arrangements have become an important part of the GFSN. On the other hand, the crisis prevention system based on regulatory rules has been continuously refined. After the 2008 global financial crisis, the international community overhauled the global financial regulatory system through a number of major reforms, including issuing Basel III, enhancing the robustness of banking institutions, and strengthening the supervision of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). China has been actively involved in the formulation and implementation of international regulatory standards, and is one of the few economies that have fully implemented Basel III. China has developed a regulatory framework for SIFIs, and its systemically important banks have all met the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements. China has put in place a deposit insurance scheme capable of providing full protection for more than 99 percent of depositors. It has also issued and fully implemented regulations on asset management, which has significantly reduced the risk of shadow banking. Currently, the global financial stability system is faced with some new challenges. First, the regulatory framework remains fragmented. There is even a propensity to “race to the bottom”. In recent years, due to domestic political headwinds, some countries have wavered in their implementation of international regulatory rules, such as Basel III. It may lead to regulatory arbitrage, and undermine global financial stability system. The international community should proactively implement the agreed regulatory reform measures, thereby preventing regulatory arbitrage and cross-border transmission of risks. Second, the regulation on emerging areas, such as digital finance, remains insufficient. For example, global regulatory coordination is incommensurate with the quick-expanding crypto asset market, and coordination on climate risk-related regulatory framework is yet to be improved. Regulatory stance swings widely, and is highly prone to political influence. A harmonized regulatory standard on the adoption of artificial intelligence in the financial sector is also absent. The international community needs to strengthen coordination and bridge the gaps in regulation. Third, the regulation on non-bank intermediaries remains lax. In the past two decades, the weight of non-bank intermediaries in global financing has risen significantly. Funding through non-bank intermediaries is relatively unstable and less transparent, yet the leverage is rising, which calls for enhanced regulation. We believe that the key path to crisis prevention and resolution is to establish a diversified and efficient GFSN with a powerful IMF at its core, and to ensure the consistency and authority of global financial regulatory rules. This is also the path that we must follow through. IV. On the Governance of International Financial Organizations After the World War II, starting with the founding of the IMF and the World Bank, the international community gradually built up a multi-tiered and multi-dimensional system of international financial organizations, covering areas such as international policy coordination, financial regulatory rule-making, and multilateral development. These organizations have become major platforms for international financial governance, and they play an important role in promoting global economic and trade growth as well as safeguarding global financial stability. While global economic landscape keeps changing, quotas and voting power haven’t seen any material adjustments for a long time in major international financial organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as in some regional financial organizations. As a result, emerging markets and developing countries are significantly underrepresented, and this is incommensurate with their actual weight in the global economy. Moreover, the international community should also be well aware of the fact that a few member countries pursue unilateralism, and they have meddled in the governance and operation of international financial organizations. International financial organizations need to keep pace with the times and advance governance reforms to reflect in time the relative positions of member countries in the global economy and enhance the voice and representativeness of emerging markets and developing countries. International financial organizations should safeguard and practice true multilateralism, and improve governance efficiency. Among all the international financial organizations, the IMF is at the core, and it plays a vital role in global economic and financial governance. The IMF is a quota-based international financial organization. The size of quotas determines the IMF’s crisis response capacity in crisis, while quota shares determine member countries’ voting power in the IMF and the amount of financing they have access to. The current quota shares can not reflect the relative positions of member countries in the global economy. An immediate quota share realignment in line with the consensus reached is crucial for the IMF to improve governance and enhance its legitimacy and representativeness. The global economy is now facing heightened uncertainty. While improving their governance structures, major international financial organizations should further reinforce their roles in economic surveillance. They should assess objectively the risks facing the world and individual countries, and offer guidance to member countries to cement their support for economic globalization and the multilateral trading system. They should also strengthen policy guidance for member countries and enhance macroeconomic policy coordination to keep the international financial system stable. Dear guests, Improving global financial governance requires more frequent dialogues and stronger cooperation among all parties. Staying committed to reform and opening-up and upholding a path of multilateralism, we will work actively to play a constructive role in helping foster a global financial governance system that is more equitable, fair, inclusive, and resilient. To conclude, I wish the Forum a full success. Thank you. 2025-06-18/en/2025/0618/2309.html
-
近年来，人民银行宁波市分行（外汇局宁波市分局）深入学习贯彻习近平总书记关于坚持高水平对外开放的重要论述精神，积极推进外汇领域改革创新，聚焦企业汇率避险业务中“不肯办、不愿办、不会办”等难点，通过迭代升级奖补政策、指导银行优化服务、多层次宣导汇率风险中性理念等方式，综合施策帮助涉外企业提升汇率风险管理能力。 迭代升级奖补政策，有效降低业务办理成本。企业使用汇率避险工具，通常需结合产品类型和期限缴纳一定费用，对部分中小企业的现金流形成一定压力。针对涉外企业因汇率避险业务费用问题而“不肯办”的问题，以“小微企业”为重要突破口，通过“政府补贴一点，银行让利一点”的方式，充分激发“企业主动一点”的业务办理动力。2021-2024年，先后推出政策性担保、买入期权费用补助等扶持政策，4年共计发放补助资金251.2万元，惠及1212家企业，有效帮助辖内企业降低汇率避险成本。今年4月，联合市商务局、财政局进一步加码政策支持力度，出台中小外贸企业期权业务费用补助政策，按照政银企三方共担原则，对符合条件的企业买入期权业务费用，由财政补助30%，银行承担40%，企业仅需自负30%，充分降低企业汇率避险业务办理成本，助推业务规模稳步提升。今年1-5月，全市汇率避险签约金额282.8亿美元，较去年同期增长50.5%，共有2403家企业办理汇率避险业务，规模领跑全省。 聚焦经营主体需求，指导银行提升服务质效。针对部分企业“赌人民币升贬”谋利或因办理汇率避险业务缴纳保证金、占用授信等情况而“不愿办”的问题，深入开展调研摸清企业需求，并多措并举压实银行主体责任，从供求两端推进汇率避险工作。一是深入一线摸清实情。以现场调研、召开座谈会等形式，与重点企业面对面交流企业汇率风险管理需求、金融产品供给等问题，积极回应经营主体关切的各类外汇管理政策咨询。二是深化减费让利服务。鼓励银行主动减免费用、给予点差优惠，提供不占企业授信总额的汇率避险产品专项授信，以及无抵押、无担保或免收保证金的汇率避险产品。三是推出专属定制服务。鼓励银行积极为企业提供个性化、差异化的汇率避险产品，为客户量身定制全生命周期的汇率避险管理服务。四是优化线上办理服务。推动银行依托科技赋能开发线上产品，支持各类外汇交易业务全流程在线办理，单笔办理时间由原来的10至15分钟缩短至30秒以内，显著提升业务办理效率。 协同联动各方力量，多渠道开展政策宣传。汇率风险管理需要专业的金融知识和风险管理技能，不少企业缺乏相应的人才和团队，国有企业则因内部风控等原因导致工作人员业务经验普遍不足。人行宁波市分行组织开展多轮汇率避险专题宣传活动，同时积极发挥外汇自律机制作用，协同辖内银行开展一系列汇率避险政策、风险中性理念宣导，推动解决辖内企业汇率避险业务“不会办”的问题。一是线下+线上批量触达，宣传渠道全面覆盖。今年，先后主办线下汇率避险系列宣传活动5次，参与企业家数600余家。各金融机构通过线上视频会议、微信群交流、视频号等方式及时向企业传递汇率市场动向，帮助企业答疑解难。二是外汇联络员上门宣导，政策服务精准直达。针对企业汇率避险专业知识缺乏等问题，建立健全外汇联络员服务工作机制，1-5月全市1100余名外汇“联络员”累计走访企业1.9万余家次。同时，引导银行重点关注企业高管开展专题汇率避险宣传和培训，精准提升企业汇率避险运用的意识和能力。三是聚焦国企靶向施策，分类宣导提升质效。紧盯国有企业这一重点主体，联合市国资委召开国有企业汇率避险座谈会，向我市国有企业集团定向发送《国有企业汇率风险管理指引》。同时，引导银行分类精准施策，对于未开展汇率避险的企业从基本概念和业务操作入手，推动企业试做业务；对于已开展业务的企业，“一对一”进行跟踪服务，推动企业由简及繁、丰富产品运用。 2025-06-20/ningbo/2025/0620/2374.html
-
外汇局广东省分局积极落实优化支付服务工作要求，加强外汇便利化政策传导，指导银行健全个人外汇服务质量保障机制，持续做好个人外汇服务。 ——银校合作，单位代办，提升外籍教师用汇服务水平。广东某学院现有外籍教师150余人。为方便外籍教师日常薪酬购付汇需求，有关银行与学校合作，由学校提供外籍教师薪酬购汇所需要的工资清单、劳动合同以及完税证明等材料，外籍教师提供本人护照以及银行卡即可办理薪酬购付汇，降低了外籍教师亲赴银行网点自行提供购汇证明的“脚底成本”和沟通成本，获得了学校和外籍教师的一致认可。 ——把握业务实质，解决复杂背景下境外个人房租购汇汇出难题。香港C女士需将其继承境内一处商住一体物业的租金收入购汇汇出。有关银行经核实原物业持有者身份，结合房管部门调档信息等，综合判断该物业租金收入属于非居民经常项下合法收益，并在审核相关租赁合同、出租屋备案证明、租金入账流水、完税证明后，为C女士办理了租金收入购汇汇出。C女士对银行专业和高效的服务表示认可。 2025-06-20/guangdong/2025/0617/3005.html
-
近日，秦皇岛市分局召开资本项目外汇业务培训会，进一步提升银行基层外汇业务人员的政策理解和实操能力。全市主要外汇银行国际业务部门负责人及业务骨干共20余人参会。 会议围绕外商投资企业基本信息登记、变更登记、境外直接投资变更登记、利润汇出四项银行最常见的业务开展深入探讨。通过“政策解读+案例剖析+互动研讨”的多维模式，有效提升了参训人员对资本项目外汇管理规定的理解深度和执行精度。参会银行普遍反映，培训内容紧密贴合基层业务痛点，特别是对指引中审核要素进行了重点阐释，为后续优化业务流程、防范合规风险提供了清晰指引。 2025-06-20/hebei/2025/0620/2361.html
-
弹好“完善县域外汇服务工作机制”的前奏曲，做县域服务提质增效的倡导者。加强支部联动，开展“党员先锋下基层”党建联建活动。组建外汇服务专家团队，直接为县域企业提供外汇领域专业支撑。在外汇业务量大的仁寿县和彭山区，设立“直联点”，推动外汇服务下沉县域，直联到底，负责到企，直接对接县域工业园区重点涉外企业业务需求。 弹好“普及外汇知识”的合唱曲，做外汇法规政策的传播者。会同市商务局、金融监管局等政府部门，联合出口信用保险公司，组织辖内银行和仁寿外汇管理营业部，进园区、进企业，开展县域全覆盖的宣传活动。组织眉山市外汇市场自律机制成员单位，召开县域企业外汇便利化暨跨境人民币政策宣讲会。推广“汇蓉易”跨境服务小助手和网上银行的外汇业务功能，引导县域企业通过线上方式自助查询咨询外汇法规政策和外汇服务产品。 弹好“外汇便利化服务”的进行曲，做外汇领域改革创新的践行者。坚持“局长走流程”，局领导带队走访县域企业，指导银行动态调整县域外汇便利化工作思路。以县域中小微企业为重点，拓展外汇便利化服务深度和广度，推动银行优化对县域中小微企业的汇率风险管理服务。落实“大额刷卡、小额扫码、现金兜底”要求，县域重点文旅场所均实现外币兑换和外卡取现。加大跨境金融服务平台推广力度，提升县域经营主体外汇服务体验感。 2025-06-20/sichuan/2025/0620/2969.html
-
附件：宁波市分局执法证持证人员信息（截至2025年6月17日） 2025-06-20/ningbo/2025/0620/2376.html
-
2025-06-19https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202506/content_7028555.htm
-
2025-06-19https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202506/content_7028563.htm
-
2025-06-20https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202506/content_7028679.htm
-
近年来，为提升境内外人士跨境消费体验，各类移动支付方式不断涌现，应用场景逐步拓展。为便于申报主体准确进行国际收支统计申报，国家外汇管理局结合近期收到的疑问和咨询情况，整理形成政策问答。 一、外包内用业务的国际收支统计申报 外包内用业务指非居民个人使用境外电子钱包，在境内进行移动支付的业务。按照受理主体，外包内用业务分为两种模式。 （一）由境内银行卡清算机构（目前为银联）受理的外包内用业务，指非居民个人使用与银联合作的境外电子钱包，在境内商户进行移动支付的业务。从资金流角度看，当非居民个人向境内商户支付时，资金从境外发卡行经跨境支付渠道划转至境内银行卡清算机构境内账户。境内银行卡清算机构完成资金清算和结汇后，通过境内收单机构将资金结算至境内商户。 申报指南：根据《国家外汇管理局关于印发〈通过银行进行国际收支统计申报业务指引（2023年版）〉的通知》（汇发〔2023〕10号）要求，境内银行卡清算机构应通过境内银行将其银行卡清算相关的涉外收付款申报在“223029-其他私人旅行”项下（含银联网联二维码互联互通数据），境内收单机构无需重复报送。同时，根据《国家外汇管理局关于印发〈对外金融资产负债及交易统计制度〉的通知》（汇发〔2021〕36号）要求，境内银行卡清算机构应填报G02表（境外银行卡境内消费提现），境内收单机构无需重复报送。 （二）由境内非银支付机构（如支付宝、财付通等）、网络支付清算平台运营机构（目前为网联）受理的外包内用业务或数字人民币外包内用业务。从资金流角度看，当非居民个人使用境外钱包向境内商户支付时，境外资金通过跨境支付渠道汇至境内合作机构（如非银支付机构、网联的合作银行或与境外银行合作的数字人民币业务运营机构），境内合作机构再通过境内非银收单机构、收单银行、服务商户的数字人民币业务运营机构、数字人民币受理服务机构等将资金结算至境内商户。 申报指南：根据汇发〔2023〕10号文要求，对于境内非银支付机构受理的境外钱包业务，由境内非银支付机构在与境外进行涉外收付款时，以自身名义通过合法清算机构（银联或网联）作为技术通道接入“数字外管”平台，就每日跨境清算交易进行申报；对于网络支付清算平台运营机构受理的境外钱包业务，由合作银行以自身名义进行间接申报（银联网联二维码互联互通场景除外）；对于数字人民币外包内用业务，由与境外银行合作的境内数字人民币业务运营机构以自身名义进行间接申报，境内服务商户的数字人民币业务运营机构、数字人民币受理服务机构无需重复申报。以上间接申报的交易编码选择“223029-其他私人旅行”。 二、外卡内绑业务的国际收支统计申报 外卡内绑业务指非居民个人在境内电子钱包（含数字人民币钱包）上绑定境外银行卡，在境内进行移动支付的业务。按照是否有境内银行卡清算机构参与，外卡内绑业务分为两种模式。 （一）有境内银行卡清算机构（目前为银联、连通）参与跨境资金清算的外卡内绑业务。当非居民向境内商户支付时，资金从境外发卡行经跨境支付渠道划转至境内银行卡清算机构境内账户，其完成资金清算和结汇后，最终通过非银收单机构将资金结算至境内商户。 申报指南：根据汇发〔2023〕10号文要求，境内银行卡清算机构应通过境内银行将其银行卡清算相关的涉外收付款申报在“223029-其他私人旅行”项下，境内非银收单机构无需重复报送。同时，根据汇发〔2021〕36号文要求，境内银行卡清算机构应填报G02表（境外银行卡境内消费提现），境内非银收单机构无需重复报送。 （二）无境内银行卡清算机构参与跨境资金清算的外卡内绑业务。当非居民向境内商户支付时，境外银行卡清算机构将资金清算至境内收单银行。收单银行结汇后通过非银收单机构将资金结算至境内商户，或由数字人民币业务运营机构通过数字人民币金融基础设施将资金结算至境内商户。 申报指南：境内收单银行应按照汇发〔2021〕36号文要求报送G02表（境外银行卡境内消费提现），境内非银收单机构和数字人民币业务运营机构、数字人民币受理服务机构无需重复报送。 三、内包外用业务的国际收支统计申报 内包外用业务指境内居民使用境内电子钱包（含数字人民币钱包），在境外进行移动支付的业务。按照钱包运营主体，内包外用业务分为两种模式。 （一）钱包运营主体与境内银行卡清算机构合作（包括境内银行钱包、银联云闪付等）。从资金流角度看，当境内居民在境外商户支付时，境内银行卡清算机构通过境内清算代理行完成银行卡清算和购汇后，向境外汇出资金。 申报指南：根据汇发〔2023〕10号文要求，境内银行卡清算机构应通过境内银行将其银行卡清算相关的涉外收付款申报在“223029-其他私人旅行”项下，境内发卡银行无需重复报送。同时，根据汇发〔2021〕36号文要求，境内银行卡清算机构应填报G01表（境内银行卡境外消费提现），境内发卡银行无需重复报送。 （二）钱包运营主体为非银支付机构（如支付宝、财付通等）、数字人民币业务运营机构等。当境内居民在境外商户支付时，居民通过钱包内绑定的境内卡或者钱包余额等资金渠道完成支付。对于非银支付机构类电子钱包，非银支付机构通过境内合作银行与境外进行汇款结算；对于与网络支付清算平台运营机构（目前为网联）合作的电子钱包，由清算平台的境内合作银行与境外进行汇款结算；对于数字人民币钱包，由境内数字人民币业务运营机构通过数字人民币金融基础设施与境外进行数字人民币跨境结算。 申报指南：根据汇发〔2023〕10号文的规定，对于非银支付机构类电子钱包，境内支付机构应以自身名义通过境内合作银行进行间接申报；对于网络支付清算平台运营机构受理的内包外用业务，由其合作银行以自身名义进行间接申报；对于数字人民币钱包，由境内数字人民币业务运营机构以自身名义进行间接申报。上述交易均申报在“223029-其他私人旅行”项下。 四、数字人民币业务的国际收支统计申报 （一）数字人民币跨境业务申报范围和要求 申报指南：境内居民和境内非居民通过数字人民币钱包从境外收到的款项和对境外支付的款项，以及境内居民通过数字人民币钱包与境内非居民之间发生的收付款（含数字人民币钱包间及数字人民币钱包与银行账户间），涉外收付款人和数字人民币业务运营机构应按照汇发〔2023〕10号文要求进行申报。其中，除经常项目管理和资本项目管理有明确要求外，境内居民个人和机构通过境内数字人民币业务运营机构与境内非居民个人间的数字人民币收付款暂不进行间接申报。 数字人民币业务运营机构开展数字人民币跨境业务涉及对外金融资产负债及交易业务的，应按照汇发〔2021〕36号文要求报送相关报表。 （二）数字人民币钱包居民身份的判定 数字人民币钱包可根据开立主体分为个人钱包与单位钱包。个人钱包包括一至四类，一至三类为实名钱包，四类钱包基于手机号开立，具备可控匿名特性；单位钱包均为实名钱包。对于四类个人钱包，数字人民币业务运营机构不掌握个人身份信息，需要借助其他信息对居民身份进行判定。 数字人民币硬钱包是以嵌入安全芯片的IC卡、SIM卡、手机终端、穿戴设备、物联网设备等特定硬件为载体的钱包。硬钱包的居民身份应根据发行模式进行判定：账户模式硬钱包在发行时与个人身份相关联，可据此判定居民或非居民身份；准账户模式硬钱包在发行时与境内数字人民币业务运营机构或其合作机构的单位钱包相关联，并可通过数字人民币App与开立的个人钱包绑定，可根据其关联的境内单位钱包或个人钱包居民身份相应判定硬钱包的居民身份。 申报指南：对于实名钱包，数字人民币业务运营机构可根据掌握的客户资料，按照汇发〔2023〕10号文要求进行居民或非居民身份判定。对于四类个人钱包，数字人民币业务运营机构应当根据用户注册数字人民币钱包手机号的境内/境外归属地认定用户身份，将通过境外手机号开立钱包的主体认定为非居民。 对于四类个人钱包的间接申报，客户名称可填“数字人民币钱包+钱包编号”，证件类型可填“其他”，证件号码可填手机号，客户常驻国家（地区）代码按照手机号归属国家（地区）认定。四类个人钱包升级为实名钱包后，根据身份证件信息认定居民属性发生变化的，对变化前已发生的交易，无需追溯修改。 （三）数字人民币兑出兑回业务的申报 数字人民币兑出业务指将银行账户资金或现钞兑换为数字人民币，反之为兑回业务。 申报指南：境内居民和境内非居民的跨境兑出、兑回业务，是其自身资金在境内数字人民币钱包和境外银行账户之间的划转，应通过境内数字人民币业务运营机构进行间接申报。境内居民数字人民币钱包和境外银行账户间的划转，申报在“821030-收回或调回存放境外存款本金/存放境外存款”项下；境内非居民数字人民币钱包和境外银行账户间的划转，申报在“822030-境外存入款项/调出”项下。非居民境内银行账户和数字人民币钱包间的兑出、兑回业务无需进行间接申报。 （四）数字人民币钱柜头寸调拨的申报 数字人民币业务运营机构的境外分支机构在运营机构总行开立钱柜，并基于流动性安排进行钱柜余额出入库调整、总行与境外分支机构以及境外分支机构间的头寸调拨等。 申报指南：数字人民币业务运营机构应按照汇发〔2021〕36号文要求报送D05表（存款负债）。 （五）多边央行数字货币桥业务的申报 1.桥上跨境交易申报 申报指南：多边央行数字货币桥是银行间资金清算渠道之一，不改变居民和非居民间涉外收付款的交易性质。境内涉外收付款人通过境内经办银行办理涉外收付款业务时，经办银行（数字人民币业务运营机构）如使用货币桥渠道与对手方银行进行资金结算，应按照汇发〔2023〕10号文的要求，督促和指导居民和非居民进行申报。数字人民币业务运营机构自身通过货币桥进行的资金清算无需进行间接申报。 2.上下桥及桥上钱包头寸的申报 数字人民币业务运营机构资金上下桥，指运营机构将桥下的数字人民币或银行账户资金与桥上多币种钱包资金进行转换的行为。 申报指南：上下桥是数字人民币业务运营机构自身账户之间的资金摆布，不涉及跨境交易，无需进行国际收支统计申报。 （六）非居民数字人民币钱包的申报 申报指南：非居民数字人民币钱包余额属于数字人民币业务运营机构吸收的非居民存款，数字人民币业务运营机构应按照汇发〔2021〕36号文要求报送D05表（存款负债）。 （七）关于数字人民币业务标识的设置 申报指南：现阶段，在国际收支统计申报中，数字人民币业务运营机构无需对数字人民币业务进行区分，报送交易币种时选择“CNY”。 （八）关于合作模式数字人民币业务的申报 数字人民币业务的合作模式指非运营机构的银行与数字人民币业务运营机构进行合作，由非运营机构的银行与客户建立业务关系并提供服务，数字人民币业务运营机构仅向非运营机构提供技术服务或资金处理服务的模式。 申报指南：间接申报遵循“离客户更近”的原则，应由掌握全量、准确客户信息和交易信息的银行指导客户进行申报。因此，应由实际为客户开展业务的银行指导客户履行申报义务，数字人民币业务运营机构无需重复申报。 2025-06-20/beijing/2025/0620/2586.html