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As at the end of March 2024, China recorded RMB 17.827 trillion in outstanding external debt denominated in both domestic and foreign currencies (equivalent to USD 2512.6 billion, excluding those of Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, and Taiwan Province of China, the same below). In terms of maturity structure, the outstanding medium-and long-term external debt was RMB 7819.7 billion (equivalent to USD 1102.1 billion), accounting for 44 percent; while the outstanding short-term external debt was RMB 10007.4 billion (equivalent to USD 1410.5 billion), taking up 56 percent, of which 33 percent was trade-related credit. In terms of institutional sectors, the outstanding debt of general government totaled RMB 3034.6 billion (equivalent to USD 427.7 billion), accounting for 17 percent; the outstanding debt of the central bank totaled RMB 830.6 billion (equivalent to USD 117.1 billion), accounting for 5 percent; the outstanding debt of banks totaled RMB 7747.2 billion (equivalent to USD 1091.9 billion), accounting for 43 percent; the outstanding debt of other sectors (including inter-company lending under direct investments) totaled RMB 6214.6 billion (equivalent to USD 875.9 billion), accounting for 35 percent. In terms of debt instruments, the balance of loans was RMB 2790.1 billion (equivalent to USD 393.2 billion), accounting for 16 percent; the outstanding trade credits and advances was RMB 2636.5 billion (equivalent to USD 371.6 billion), accounting for 15 percent; the outstanding currency and deposits was RMB 3572.4 billion (equivalent to USD 503.5 billion), accounting for 20 percent; the outstanding debt securities was RMB 5624.3 billion (equivalent to USD 792.7 billion), accounting for 31 percent; the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation amounted to RMB 340.1 billion (equivalent to USD 47.9 billion), accounting for 2 percent; the balance of inter-company lending under direct investments totaled RMB 1998.4 billion (equivalent to USD 281.7 billion), accounting for 11 percent; and the balance of other debt liabilities was RMB 865.2 billion (equivalent to USD 121.9 billion), accounting for 5 percent. With respect to currency structures, the outstanding external debt in domestic currency totaled RMB 8558.7 billion (equivalent to USD 1206.3 billion), accounting for 48 percent; the outstanding external debt in foreign currencies (including SDR allocation) totaled RMB 9268.3 billion (equivalent to USD 1306.3 billion), accounting for 52 percent. In the outstanding registered external debt in foreign currencies, the USD debt accounted for 83 percent, the Euro debt accounted for 7 percent, the HKD debt accounted for 4 percent, the JPY debt accounted for 4 percent, the SDR and other foreign currency-denominated external debt accounted for 2 percent. Since all major external debt indicators were within the internationally recognized thresholds, China’s external debt risk is under control. Appendix Definition of terms and interpretations External debt classification by maturity structure. There are two methods to classify the external debt by maturity structure. One is on the basis of the contractual maturity, i.e. it is classified as medium- and long-term external debt if the contractual maturity is over one year, and classified as short-term external debt if the contractual maturity is one year or less; the other is on the basis of the remaining maturity, i.e., on the basis of the contractual maturity classification method above, the medium- and long-term external debt due within one year is classified as short-term external debt. In this news release, external debt is divided into medium- and long-term external debt and short-term external debt based on the contractual maturity. Trade-related credit is a broad concept. In addition to trade credit and advances, it also involves other kinds of credit provided for trade activities. According to its definition, trade-related credit includes trade credit and advances, bank trade financing, trade related bills, and so forth. In particular, trade credit and advances refer to external liability arising from directly extending credit between the seller and buyer of goods transactions, specifically transactions between residents in the Chinese Mainland and overseas non-residents (including non-residents in Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, and Taiwan Province of China), i.e., the debt incurred due to the difference between the time of payment and the time of the goods ownership transfer, which include credit directly provided by the supplier (e.g., the overseas exporter) for goods and services, and prepayments made by buyers (e.g., overseas importers) for goods, services, and work that is in progress (or work to be undertaken). Bank trade financing refers to trade related loans that offered by a third party(e.g., banks) to exporters or importers, for instance, loans extended by foreign financial institutions or export credit agencies to buyers. Annexed table：China’s Gross External Debt Position by Sector, End of March 2024 End of March 2024 End of March 2024 （Unit:100 million RMB） （Unit:100 million US dollars） General Government 30346 4277 Short-term 2008 283 Currency and deposits 0 0 Debt securities 2008 283 Loans 0 0 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 0 0 Long-term 28338 3994 Special drawing rights (allocations) 0 0 Currency and deposits 0 0 Debt securities 24466 3448 Loans 3872 546 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 0 0 Central Bank 8306 1171 Short-term 2469 348 Currency and deposits 1270 179 Debt securities 1199 169 Loans 0 0 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 0 0 Long-term 5838 823 Special drawing rights (allocations) 3401 479 Currency and deposits 0 0 Debt securities 0 0 Loans 0 0 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 2436 343 Other Depository Corporations 77472 10919 Short-term 60384 8511 Currency and deposits 34442 4854 Debt securities 8024 1131 Loans 17339 2444 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 578 82 Long-term 17088 2408 Currency and deposits 0 0 Debt securities 14216 2004 Loans 2793 394 Trade credit and advances 0 0 Other debt liabilities 80 11 Other Sectors 42162 5942 Short-term 29992 4227 Currency and deposits 11 2 Debt securities 148 21 Loans 1148 162 Trade credit and advances 25904 3651 Other debt liabilities 2779 392 Long-term 12170 1715 Currency and deposits 0 0 Debt securities 6182 871 Loans 2749 387 Trade credit and advances 461 65 Other debt liabilities 2778 392 Direct Investment: Intercompany Lending 19984 2817 Debt liabilities of direct investment enterprises to direct investors 11372 1603 Debt liabilities of direct investors to direct investment enterprises 1381 195 Debt liabilities to fellow enterprises 7231 1019 Gross External Debt Position 178270 25126 Notes: 1. The short-term and long-term herein are broken down by contractual (original) maturity. 2. The data in this table have been rounded off. 2024-06-28/en/2024/0628/2217.html
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In the first quarter of 2024, China's current account registered a surplus of RMB 281.4 billion, and the capital and financial accounts recorded a deficit of RMB 535.0 billion. The financial account (excluding reserve assets) recorded a deficit of RMB 223.1 billion, and reserve assets increased by RMB 311.8 billion. In the US dollar terms, in the first quarter of 2024, China's current account recorded a surplus of USD 39.2 billion, including a surplus of USD 121.3 billion under trade in goods, a deficit of USD 61.2 billion under trade in services, a deficit of USD 24.3 billion under primary income and a surplus of USD 3.4 billion under secondary income. The capital and financial accounts recorded a deficit of USD 74.4 billion, including a deficit of USD 20.9 million under the capital account, and a deficit of USD 31.0 billion under the financial account (excluding reserve assets), and reserve assets increased by USD 43.4 billion. In SDR terms, in the first quarter of 2024, China posted a surplus of SDR 29.4 billion under the current account, and a deficit of SDR 56.0 billion under the capital and financial accounts. The financial account (excluding reserve assets) registered a deficit of SDR 23.3 billion, and reserve assets increased by SDR 32.6 billion.(End) Abridged Balance of Payments, Q1 2024 Item Line No. RMB 100 million USD 100 million SDR 100 million 1. Current Account 1 2814 392 294 Credit 2 64622 8991 6760 Debit 3 -61809 -8599 -6466 1. A Goods and Services 4 4314 601 451 Credit 5 60455 8412 6324 Debit 6 -56140 -7811 -5873 1.A.a Goods 7 8715 1213 912 Credit 8 53983 7511 5647 Debit 9 -45268 -6298 -4735 1.A.b Services 10 -4401 -612 -460 Credit 11 6472 900 677 Debit 12 -10873 -1513 -1137 1.B Primary Income 13 -1748 -243 -183 Credit 14 3508 488 367 Debit 15 -5255 -731 -550 1.C Secondary Income 16 247 34 26 Credit 17 660 92 69 Debit 18 -413 -57 -43 2. Capital and Financial Account 19 -5350 -744 -560 2.1 Capital Account 20 -2 -0.2 -0.2 Credit 21 4 1 0 Debit 22 -5 -1 -1 2.2 Financial Account 23 -5348 -744 -560 Assets 24 -9980 -1389 -1044 Liabilities 25 4632 645 484 2.2.1 Financial Account Excluding Reserve Assets 26 -2231 -310 -233 2.2.1.1 Direct Investment 27 -1991 -277 -208 Assets 28 -2725 -379 -285 Liabilities 29 734 102 77 2.2.1.2 Portfolio Investment 30 -1552 -216 -162 Assets 31 -3866 -538 -404 Liabilities 32 2314 322 242 2.2.1.3 Financial Derivatives (other than reserves) and Employee Stock Options 33 87 12 9 Assets 34 -105 -15 -11 Liabilities 35 192 27 20 2.2.1.4 Other Investment 36 1225 171 128 Assets 37 -167 -23 -17 Liabilities 38 1391 194 145 2.2.2 Reserve Assets 39 -3118 -434 -326 3. Net Errors and Omissions 40 2536 352 265 Notes: 1.The statement is compiled according to BPM6. Reserve assets are included in capital and financial accounts. 2."Credit" is presented as positive value while "debit" as negative value, and the difference is the sum of the "Credit" and the "Debit". All items herein refer to difference, unless marked with "Credit" or "Debit". 3.The RMB denominated quarterly BOP data is converted from the USD denominated BOP data for the quarter using the period average central parity rate of RMB against USD. The quarterly accumulated RMB denominated BOP data is derived from the sum total of the RMB denominated data for the quarters. 4.The SDR denominated quarterly BOP data is converted from the USD denominated BOP data for the quarter using the period average exchange rate of SDR against USD. The quarterly accumulated SDR denominated BOP data is derived from the sum total of the SDR denominated data for the quarters. 5. In the first quarter of 2024, the equity other than reinvestment of earnings under direct investment liabilities (credit) was USD 21.0 billion (RMB 151.2 billion). 6.This statement employs rounded-off numbers. 7.For detailed data, please see the section of “Data and Statistics” at the website of the SAFE. 8.The BOP data is revised regularly; please find the latest data in “Data and Statistics”. 2024-06-28/en/2024/0628/2214.html
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As at the end of March 2024, China’s external financial assets reached USD 9664.3 billion, external financial liabilities reached USD 6702.5 billion, and net external assets totaled USD 2961.8 billion. In the external financial assets, direct investment assets amounted to USD 2956.7 billion, portfolio investment assets, USD 1153.9 billion, financial derivative assets, USD 20.8 billion, other investment assets, USD 2063.5 billion, and reserve assets, USD 3469.4 billion, accounting for 31 percent, 12 percent, 0.2 percent, 21 percent and 36 percent of external financial assets respectively. In external liabilities, direct investment liabilities were USD 3510.3 billion, portfolio investment liabilities, USD 1740.3 billion, financial derivative liabilities, USD 26.5 billion and other investment liabilities, USD 1425.3 billion, accounting for 52 percent, 26 percent, 0.4 percent and 21 percent of the external financial liabilities respectively. In SDR terms, China’s external financial assets and liabilities reached SDR 7299.0 billion and SDR 5062.1 billion respectively, and external net assets totaled SDR 2236.9 billion at the end of March 2024.(End) China's International Investment Position, End of March 2024 Item Line No. Position in 100 million USD Position in 100 million SDR Net Position 1 29618 22369 Assets 2 96643 72990 1 Direct Investment 3 29567 22331 1.1 Equity and Investment Fund Shares 4 25644 19368 1.2 Debt Instruments 5 3923 2963 1.a Financial Sectors 6 4131 3120 1.1.a Equity and Investment Fund Shares 7 3899 2944 1.2.a Debt Instruments 8 232 175 1.b Non-financial Sectors 9 25436 19211 1.1.b Equity and Investment Fund Shares 10 21746 16424 1.2.b Debt Instruments 11 3691 2787 2 Portfolio Investment 12 11539 8715 2.1 Equity and Investment Fund Shares 13 6565 4958 2.2 Debt Securities 14 4974 3756 3 Financial Derivatives (other than reserves) and Employee Stock Options 15 208 157 4 Other Investment 16 20635 15585 4.1 Other Equity 17 99 75 4.2 Currency and Deposits 18 5073 3832 4.3 Loans 19 8041 6073 4.4 Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes 20 293 221 4.5 Trade Credit and Advances 21 6172 4661 4.6 Others 22 957 723 5 Reserve Assets 23 34694 26203 5.1 Monetary Gold 24 1611 1216 5.2 Special Drawing Rights 25 532 402 5.3 Reserve Position in the IMF 26 98 74 5.4 Foreign Currency Reserves 27 32457 24513 5.5 Other Reserve Assets 28 -3 -3 Liabilities 29 67025 50621 1 Direct Investment 30 35103 26512 1.1 Equity and Investment Fund Shares 31 32157 24287 1.2 Debt Instruments 32 2946 2225 1.a Financial Sectors 33 1975 1492 1.1.a Equity and Investment Fund Shares 34 1775 1341 1.2.a Debt Instruments 35 200 151 1.b Non-financial Sectors 36 33128 25020 1.1.b Equity and Investment Fund Shares 37 30382 22946 1.2.b Debt Instruments 38 2746 2074 2 Portfolio Investment 39 17403 13144 2.1 Equity and Investment Fund Shares 40 10244 7737 2.2 Debt Securities 41 7160 5408 3 Financial Derivatives (other than reserves) and Employee Stock Options 42 265 200 4 Other Investment 43 14253 10764 4.1 Other Equity 44 0 0 4.2 Currency and Deposits 45 5067 3827 4.3 Loans 46 3791 2863 4.4 Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes 47 269 203 4.5 Trade Credit and Advances 48 3716 2807 4.6 Others 49 930 703 4.7 Special Drawing Rights 50 479 362 Notes:1. This table employs rounded-off numbers. 2.Net International Investment Position refers to assets minus liabilities. Positive figure refers to net assets, and negative figure refers to net liabilities. 3.The SDR denominated data is converted from the USD denominated data, using the exchange rate of SDR against USD at the end of the quarter. 4.The IIP data is revised regularly; please find the latest data in “Data and Statistics”. 2024-06-28/en/2024/0628/2216.html
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The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has recently released data on foreign exchange settlement and sales by banks as well as cross-border receipts and payments by non-banking sectors for May 2024. The SAFE Deputy Administrator and Press Spokesperson Wang Chunying answered media questions regarding the topic. Q: Could you brief us on China’s foreign exchange receipts and payments for May 2024? A: China’s foreign exchange market registered a stable operation, with cross-border capital flows showing a trend toward equilibrium. In May, the foreign-related receipts and payments by non-banking sectors, including enterprises and individuals, maintained a basic balance. Cross-border capital flows showed an obvious improvement. Market expectations remained relatively stable with rational and orderly foreign exchange trading. The foreign exchange payment deficit narrowed apparently, leading to a further improved supply and demand situation in the foreign exchange market. The net inflows of cross-border capital under trade in goods increased rapidly, and the scale of foreign investment in domestic bonds maintained a high level. Supported by the continued recovery of China’s foreign trade, the net inflows of cross-border capital under trade in goods witnessed a 23% year-on-year increase and a 76% month-on-month increase in May, registering a monthly new high since the second half of 2023 and underscoring the importance of trade in goods in stabilizing cross-border capital flows. At the same time, foreign capital showed a strong willingness to allocate RMB assets. The net purchase of domestic bonds by foreign capital was USD 32 billion in May, realizing an 86% month-on-month increase and reaching a historically high level. Besides, domestic entities made more stable and orderly overseas investments. Looking ahead, China’s foreign exchange market has a solid foundation to sustain sound operations. The implementation of macro policies at an increased pace will further consolidate and strengthen China’s economic recovery, solidifying the fundamental support for the foreign exchange market and RMB exchange rate. Recently, multiple international institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund upwardly revised their predictions of China’s annual economic growth, showing the increased confidence of the international society in China’s economic development. Chinese enterprises have kept their innovation and development in the past years, continuously improving their international competitiveness and their capability of adapting to changes in the external environment. The foreign exchange market participants are becoming more and more mature, and the instruments for avoiding exchange rate risks are getting more and more extensive application. The proportion of cross-border RMB settlement is increasing stably, and the capacity of exchange rate risk management is continuously strengthening. The inherent resilience of the foreign exchange market is beneficial for maintaining its stable operation. 2024-06-17/en/2024/0617/2219.html
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According to the statistics of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the Chinese foreign exchange market (excluding foreign currency pairs, the same below) recorded total transactions of RMB 22.33 trillion (equivalent to USD 3.14 trillion) in June 2024. In terms of markets, the transactions volume of client market was RMB 3.40 trillion (equivalent to USD 0.48 trillion), and the transactions volume of interbank market was RMB 18.93 trillion (equivalent to USD 2.66 trillion). In terms of products, the cumulative transactions volume of the spot market was RMB 7.16 trillion (equivalent to USD 1.01 trillion), and that of the derivatives market was RMB 15.17 trillion (equivalent to USD 2.13 trillion). From January to June 2024, a total of RMB 135.43 trillion (equivalent to USD 19.06 trillion) was traded in the Chinese foreign exchange market. 2024-07-26/en/2024/0726/2222.html
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According to the statistics of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the Chinese foreign exchange market (excluding foreign currency pairs, the same below) recorded total transactions of RMB 23.89 trillion (equivalent to USD 3.36 trillion) in May 2024. In terms of markets, the transactions volume of client market was RMB 3.16 trillion (equivalent to USD 0.45 trillion), and the transactions volume of interbank market was RMB 20.72 trillion (equivalent to USD 2.92 trillion). In terms of products, the cumulative transactions volume of the spot market was RMB 7.81 trillion (equivalent to USD 1.10 trillion), and that of the derivatives market was RMB 16.08 trillion (equivalent to USD 2.26 trillion). From January to May 2024, a total of RMB 113.09 trillion (equivalent to USD 15.92 trillion) was traded in the Chinese foreign exchange market. 2024-06-28/en/2024/0628/2215.html
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According to the statistics by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), by the end of May 2024, China’s foreign exchange reserves totaled USD 3.2320 trillion, up by USD 31.2 billion or 0.98% from April 2024. In May 2024, the US dollar index fell, while global financial asset prices generally rose, influenced by factors such as monetary policy expectations and macroeconomic data in major economies. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased this month due to the combined effects of currency translation and changes in asset prices. China’s inherent driving force for the economy continues to strengthen, and the momentum for economic recovery is consolidating, which will support the sustained basic stability of the scale of foreign exchange reserves. 2024-06-07/en/2024/0607/2218.html
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Distinguished Party Secretary Chen Jining, Former PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, Mayor Gong Zheng, Deputy Director Wang Jiang, Minister Li Yunze, Chairman Wu Qing, Vice Minister Hu Haifeng, Administrator Zhu Hexin, and dear guests, Good morning! I would like to thank Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, especially Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng. Thank you for your care and support for the financial work and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). It is a great honor for me to be the co-chairperson of this year’s Lujiazui Forum. After years of efforts, the Forum has grown into a communication platform with significant global influence and wide market reach. On behalf of the PBOC and other hosts, I would like to express warm welcome and sincere gratitude to everyone. At last year’s Forum, I discussed China’s monetary policy stance and the evolution of monetary policy framework down the road. Over the past year, the PBOC has adopted an accommodative monetary policy stance and rolled out multiple monetary policy measures. The aggregate and structural policy tools have effectively supported the sustained economic recovery and financial market stability. At the same time, we have improved the monetary policy framework, optimized the intermediate monetary policy variables, cultivated policy rates, enhanced monetary policy transmission efficiency, diversified monetary policy toolkit, and strengthened policy communication and expectation guidance. The transformation of monetary policy framework is a gradual and ongoing process, and we will continue to conduct assessments and make refinements in the future. Now, I would like to share with you my observations on global financial governance. This is a very broad topic. So I will focus on four issues: international monetary system, cross-border payment system, global financial stability system, and the governance of international financial organizations. I. On the International Monetary System Throughout history, the international monetary system has never stopped evolving. The replacement of global dominant currencies reflects the profound change in the international landscape and the iteration of national competitiveness. In the 17th century, the Dutch Guilder became the early international currency. From the late 18th century to the first half of the 20th century, the British pound was the dominant currency globally. After the World War II, the U.S. dollar established its dominance and has retained its status up till now. As a global public good, the international currency, if dominated by the sovereign currency of a single country, has inherent instabilities. First, a sovereign currency issuer tends to prioritize its own interests over the supply of global public goods when its own interests conflict with the attribute as a global public good. Second, fiscal and financial regulatory issues of a sovereign currency issuer and the accumulation of structural problems in its domestic economy may generate financial risks with spillover effects, or even escalate into a global financial crisis. Third, in times of geopolitical tensions, national security concerns, or even wars, the global dominant currency tends to be instrumentalized or weaponized. The above problems have driven growing global discussions on the reform of international monetary system. Over the past decade, the driving forces behind the shifts in the international monetary system stemmed primarily from the economic and financial dimensions in the wake of the global financial crisis, and hence the discussions were centered on economic and financial developments. The discussions this time around, however, are mainly driven by geopolitical issues. Broadly speaking, there are two lines of argument. The first one is on how to weaken the excessive reliance on a single sovereign currency and its negative impacts, foster healthy competition among a few strong sovereign currencies, and put in place incentive-restraint mechanisms. A multipolar international monetary system can prompt sovereign currency issuers to strengthen policy constraints, enhance the resilience of international monetary system, and more effectively safeguard global economic and financial stability. Madam Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), noted in her recent speech that the global order based on multilateral cooperation is fracturing, with uncertainty about the dominant role of the U.S. dollar, and the changing landscape could open the door for the euro to play a greater international role. Over the past two decades, the evolution of international monetary system had two key features. The first was the creation of the euro in 1999. The euro now accounts for around 20 percent of global foreign exchange reserves, second only to the U.S. dollar. The second was the steady rise of the RMB’s international status after the global financial crisis in 2008. The RMB has already become the world’s second largest trade finance currency. Calculated on a comprehensive basis, the RMB has become the world’s third largest payment currency. Besides, the weight of the RMB in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) currency basket ranks third. Going forward, the international monetary system is likely to continue its evolution towards a system where a few sovereign currencies coexist and compete with checks and balances. Be it a single sovereign currency or a small group of sovereign currencies serving as the global dominant currency, the sovereign currency issuers should assume their responsibilities by strengthening domestic fiscal discipline and financial regulation, and advancing the structural reform of the economy. The second line of argument is on a super-sovereign currency serving as the global dominant currency, and discussions have been largely focused on SDRs. Dr. Zhou Xiaochuan, former governor of the PBOC, once raised this issue in 2009. Theoretically, SDRs can effectively overcome the inherent problems of a single sovereign currency as the global dominant currency. It offers greater stability in currency value and is better positioned to function as a global public good, as it can help manage global liquidity and facilitate crisis response. The SDR has the attributes of a super-sovereign currency. Having said that, we still lack political consensus and will globally, if the SDR were to become a global dominant currency. Moreover, insufficient market scale, depth and liquidity have limited the role of SDRs. Turning SDRs into a global dominant currency requires member countries to build political consensus, which is not easy, given the current international landscape. Optimizing operational arrangements is also needed to gradually expand the usage of SDRs. In terms of allocation and issuance mechanisms, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issues SDRs mainly as part of crisis response and mostly in the form of a large one-off allocation. In the future, the IMF can issue SDRs regularly and expand the size of issuance. Regarding the scope of use, we need to encourage private sector and market entities to use SDRs in international trade, investment and financing, and to issue SDR-denominated bonds. We need to enhance the role of SDRs as a reserve asset, and establish the SDR settlement mechanism adaptable to large-scale usage. II. On the Cross-Border Payment System The cross-border payment system serves as the artery of global funds flow. It is a keystone for facilitating international trade, investment and financing, and for safeguarding financial stability. It is also a vital pillar of the international monetary system. The evolution of the international monetary system towards coexistence of a few sovereign currencies and booming digital technologies will promote the diversification of the cross-border payment system, which will, in turn, accelerate the shifts in the international monetary system. In recent years, problems faced by the traditional cross-border payment system have loomed large. First, there is a generational differences between traditional cross-border payments and emerging digital technologies. Problems of low efficiency, high costs, and poor penetration demand urgent resolution. Second, cross-border payments require coordination among different legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as among different stakeholders. Therefore, we need to enhance international cooperation. G20 and other international organizations attach great importance to promoting cross-border payments, and formulated a roadmap to enhance cross-border payments. Third, the geopolitical rivalry has escalated. The traditional cross-border payment infrastructures can be easily politicized, weaponized, and used as unilateral sanction instruments, thus undermining the international economic and financial order. Against this background, there have been growing calls for improving the cross-border payment system. New payment infrastructures and settlement methods are continuously emerging, driving the global cross-border payment system onto a more efficient, secure, inclusive and diverse trajectory. This trend will continue to strengthen. First, the cross-border payment system has become more diversified. In terms of currency usage, an increasing number of countries and regions are using local currencies for settlement, promoting the international use of a broader range of currencies. Cross-border payments dominated by a single sovereign currency are undergoing gradual changes. As for payment channels, the rise of new cross-border payment systems and regional multilateral payment systems, along with the traditional correspondent bank model, has diversified settlement channels and further improved the efficiency of cross-border payments. After over a decade of construction and development, China has basically established a cross-border RMB payment and clearing network featuring multiple channels and wide coverage. Second, the interoperability of payment systems and payment ecosystems continues to improve. More countries and regions have extended the operating hours of their payment systems, adopted internationally standardized messaging formats, and promoted the interconnection of fast payment systems. These efforts have enhanced the efficiency of cross-border payments and reduced transaction costs. Countries and regions exemplified by Asia have made substantial progress in enhancing the interoperability of retail payment ecosystems through the interconnection of QR code payments, greatly facilitating cross-border payments by their residents. Third, new technologies are used in cross-border payments at a faster pace. Underpinned by new technologies such as blockchain and distributed ledger, central bank digital currencies and stablecoins are thriving, making possible the simultaneous processing of payment and settlement. The development has fundamentally reshaped the traditional payment landscape, and significantly shortened the cross-border payment chain. It, however, has also posed great challenges to financial regulation. Technologies, such as smart contracts and decentralized finance, will further promote the evolution and development of cross-border payment systems. III. On the Global Financial Stability System Before the 2008 financial crisis, the international community mainly relied on IMF, which is at the center of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), for crisis response during and after crisis. After the 2008 financial crisis, ex ante prevention mechanisms such as financial regulatory rules were further strengthened. On the one hand, the multi-layer financial safety net has continued to improve. I gave a speech on strengthening the financial safety net at the Boao Forum for Asia in March last year. At the global level, in recent years, the IMF has continuously enhanced its crisis response capabilities in times of crisis, strengthened its policy surveillance functions, and expanded the scope of policy surveillance. At the regional level, the European Financial Stability Facility, the Latin American Reserve Fund, the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia, and the Arab Monetary Fund have been established successively, serving as important supports for financial stability in their respective regions. At the bilateral level, central banks in the major advanced economies such as the U.S. Federal Reserve and the ECB have injected liquidity into the markets during crisis through currency swap arrangements. The local currency swap cooperation among emerging markets has also progressed steadily. The PBOC has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in over 30 countries and regions. These swap arrangements have become an important part of the GFSN. On the other hand, the crisis prevention system based on regulatory rules has been continuously refined. After the 2008 global financial crisis, the international community overhauled the global financial regulatory system through a number of major reforms, including issuing Basel III, enhancing the robustness of banking institutions, and strengthening the supervision of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). China has been actively involved in the formulation and implementation of international regulatory standards, and is one of the few economies that have fully implemented Basel III. China has developed a regulatory framework for SIFIs, and its systemically important banks have all met the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements. China has put in place a deposit insurance scheme capable of providing full protection for more than 99 percent of depositors. It has also issued and fully implemented regulations on asset management, which has significantly reduced the risk of shadow banking. Currently, the global financial stability system is faced with some new challenges. First, the regulatory framework remains fragmented. There is even a propensity to “race to the bottom”. In recent years, due to domestic political headwinds, some countries have wavered in their implementation of international regulatory rules, such as Basel III. It may lead to regulatory arbitrage, and undermine global financial stability system. The international community should proactively implement the agreed regulatory reform measures, thereby preventing regulatory arbitrage and cross-border transmission of risks. Second, the regulation on emerging areas, such as digital finance, remains insufficient. For example, global regulatory coordination is incommensurate with the quick-expanding crypto asset market, and coordination on climate risk-related regulatory framework is yet to be improved. Regulatory stance swings widely, and is highly prone to political influence. A harmonized regulatory standard on the adoption of artificial intelligence in the financial sector is also absent. The international community needs to strengthen coordination and bridge the gaps in regulation. Third, the regulation on non-bank intermediaries remains lax. In the past two decades, the weight of non-bank intermediaries in global financing has risen significantly. Funding through non-bank intermediaries is relatively unstable and less transparent, yet the leverage is rising, which calls for enhanced regulation. We believe that the key path to crisis prevention and resolution is to establish a diversified and efficient GFSN with a powerful IMF at its core, and to ensure the consistency and authority of global financial regulatory rules. This is also the path that we must follow through. IV. On the Governance of International Financial Organizations After the World War II, starting with the founding of the IMF and the World Bank, the international community gradually built up a multi-tiered and multi-dimensional system of international financial organizations, covering areas such as international policy coordination, financial regulatory rule-making, and multilateral development. These organizations have become major platforms for international financial governance, and they play an important role in promoting global economic and trade growth as well as safeguarding global financial stability. While global economic landscape keeps changing, quotas and voting power haven’t seen any material adjustments for a long time in major international financial organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as in some regional financial organizations. As a result, emerging markets and developing countries are significantly underrepresented, and this is incommensurate with their actual weight in the global economy. Moreover, the international community should also be well aware of the fact that a few member countries pursue unilateralism, and they have meddled in the governance and operation of international financial organizations. International financial organizations need to keep pace with the times and advance governance reforms to reflect in time the relative positions of member countries in the global economy and enhance the voice and representativeness of emerging markets and developing countries. International financial organizations should safeguard and practice true multilateralism, and improve governance efficiency. Among all the international financial organizations, the IMF is at the core, and it plays a vital role in global economic and financial governance. The IMF is a quota-based international financial organization. The size of quotas determines the IMF’s crisis response capacity in crisis, while quota shares determine member countries’ voting power in the IMF and the amount of financing they have access to. The current quota shares can not reflect the relative positions of member countries in the global economy. An immediate quota share realignment in line with the consensus reached is crucial for the IMF to improve governance and enhance its legitimacy and representativeness. The global economy is now facing heightened uncertainty. While improving their governance structures, major international financial organizations should further reinforce their roles in economic surveillance. They should assess objectively the risks facing the world and individual countries, and offer guidance to member countries to cement their support for economic globalization and the multilateral trading system. They should also strengthen policy guidance for member countries and enhance macroeconomic policy coordination to keep the international financial system stable. Dear guests, Improving global financial governance requires more frequent dialogues and stronger cooperation among all parties. Staying committed to reform and opening-up and upholding a path of multilateralism, we will work actively to play a constructive role in helping foster a global financial governance system that is more equitable, fair, inclusive, and resilient. To conclude, I wish the Forum a full success. Thank you. 2025-06-18/en/2025/0618/2309.html
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Distinguished Party Secretary Chen Jining, Former PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, Mayor Gong Zheng, Deputy Director Wang Jiang, Governor Pan Gongsheng, Minister Li Yunze, Chairman Wu Qing, Vice Minister Hu Haifeng, and dear guests, Good morning! It’s a great pleasure to join you at the Lujiazui Forum. I would like to take this opportunity to exchange some ideas with you on firmly advancing in-depth reforms and high-level opening-up in the foreign exchange sector, with a view to better supporting high-quality economic development. Since April, the international economic and trade order has faced severe disruptions, and global financial markets have experienced significant volatility. Under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, China has strengthened counter-cyclical adjustments to macroeconomic policies, effectively responding to external shocks. As a result, the foreign exchange market has remained generally stable despite the complex and challenging environment. Since the beginning of this year, the RMB exchange rate has moved in both directions with enhanced flexibility. The RMB exchange rate has appreciated by 1.6 percent against the US dollar and remained generally stable against a basket of currencies. China’s foreign trade has demonstrated strong resilience, with the current account surplus staying within a reasonable and balanced range. Cross-border investment has become more active, with net increase in domestic bonds holdings by overseas investors at a relatively high level, and foreign buying of domestic equities increasing recently. Looking ahead, China’s foreign exchange market remains well-positioned to maintain overall stability. First, China’s economy is expected to maintain its recovery and growth momentum. China is stepping up the implementation of more proactive and effective macroeconomic policies, placing greater strategic emphasis on expanding domestic demand and strengthening the domestic economic circulation, while also fostering and scaling up new quality productive forces. These efforts will strongly support steady and sound economic growth. Recently, multiple international organizations and investment banks have raised their growth forecasts for China in 2025. Second, the balance of payments will maintain a basic equilibrium. China remains unwavering in its commitment to opening-up, with strengthened policy measures to stabilize foreign trade and investment, and a steady expansion of financial market access. These factors will help foster more balanced cross-border capital flows. Third, China’s foreign exchange market will become more resilient. Market participants have become more mature and rational, with the proportion of corporate foreign exchange hedging and the share of RMB cross-border settlements in goods trade both rising to around 30 percent, significantly enhancing their ability to cope with exchange rate fluctuations. In recent years, we have also accumulated rich experience in managing various risks. Despite continued uncertainties and instabilities in the external environment, we have both the capability and confidence to maintain the sound operation of the foreign exchange market and keep the RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, thereby creating a favorable environment for high-quality economic development. Ladies and gentlemen, General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of staying committed to running our own affairs well and steadfastly expanding high-level opening-up, so as to counter the uncertainties of a rapidly changing external environment with the certainties of high-quality development. We will strike a balance between development and security, continue to deepen reform and opening-up in the foreign exchange sector, and promote the modernization of the foreign exchange governance system and governance capacity. Efforts will be made to build a sound foreign exchange management system featuring "greater convenience, expanded opening-up, enhanced security, and upgraded intelligence". We will unswervingly pursue a path of financial development with Chinese characteristics, thus providing stronger foreign exchange support for China’s high-quality economic development. First, in terms of "greater convenience", we will continue to improve a foreign exchange policy system that rewards integrity with greater access, and proactively enhance the quality and efficiency of foreign exchange services for the real economy. We will step up reform and innovation in foreign exchange management, and grant greater convenience to entities with strong records of compliance and integrity, thus further facilitating the cross-border trade, investment and financing. Firstly, we will focus on sci-tech enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to make significant efforts in the areas of technology finance, green finance, inclusive finance, old-age finance and digital finance. Also, we will actively support the development of new quality productive forces, and provide comprehensive foreign exchange services along the entire chain for major national strategies, key areas, and weak links. Secondly, we will steadily advance reform of bank foreign exchange operations by comprehensively optimizing the management framework for pre-transaction due diligence, differentiated review during transactions, and post-transaction monitoring and reporting, thereby achieving a better balance between improving efficiency and managing risks. Thirdly, we will establish a policy evaluation mechanism and an ecosystem assessment mechanism for foreign exchange management. Taking alignment with national strategic goals, consistency with local development realities, and the tangible benefits delivered to enterprises and the public as key criteria, we will continuously boost the real impact of policies to ensure that people and businesses gain a stronger sense of fulfillment. Second, in terms of “expanded opening-up”, we will promote high-level institutional opening-up in the foreign exchange sector to support the development of a new system for a higher-standard open economy. We will strengthen the overall planning and systematic integration of reforms, promoting RMB internationalization and the high-quality opening-up of the capital account in a coordinated manner. In addition, we will enhance the integrated management of domestic and foreign currencies, thus fostering a world-class business environment that is market-oriented, law-based, and internationalized. Firstly, we will deepen the reform of foreign exchange managements for direct investment, streamline the foreign exchange registration process for foreign direct investment (FDI), and shorten the negative list for fund use, so as to steadily support enterprises in participating in international cooperation across industrial and supply chains. Secondly, we will prudently and steadily expand the connectivity of financial markets, and refine the qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII/RQFII) program, thus facilitating foreign financial institutions in investing and operating in China. Thirdly, we will advance the reform of foreign debt management by optimizing quota management, shortening the “negative list” for the fund use of external debts, and gradually shifting the business of foreign debt registration to banks in an orderly manner. Fourthly, we will deepen the development and opening-up of the foreign exchange market, improve the product system, expand the range of market participants, and continue to enhance services for enterprises in managing exchange rate risks. Fifthly, we will support region-specific opening-up and development, explore integrated reform and innovation of foreign exchange management policies in pilot free trade zones, and actively support the development of key regions such as the Hainan Free Trade Port and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Third, regarding "enhanced security", we will strengthen the dual management framework of "macro-prudential plus micro-regulation" in the foreign exchange market to safeguard its stability and ensure national economic and financial security. Adhering to a bottom-line thinking, we will enhance open regulatory capabilities and risk prevention measures, fostering a positive interaction between high-quality development and high-level security. Firstly, we will mitigate risks rising from external shocks. We will intensify monitoring and early warning mechanisms for cross-border capital flows, strengthen macro-prudential management and expectation guidance, and maintain the RMB exchange rate at an adaptive and equilibrium level while ensuring a balanced international payments. Secondly, we will strengthen oversight in foreign exchange. We will advance the shift to entity-based regulatory approaches in the foreign exchange sector, crack down on illegal activities with heightened enforcement, and improve our capacity to identify and combat emerging criminal and illegal activities. Fourth, in "upgraded intelligence", we will leverage advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data to elevate the digital and intelligent capabilities of foreign exchange regulation. Through the development of "Smart Foreign Exchange Administration", we will provide more intelligent, efficient, secure, and user-friendly services to individuals and businesses. Simultaneously, we will enhance the intelligence, precision, and effectiveness of risk identification and regulatory oversight, empowering foreign exchange regulation with cutting-edge technological solutions. Ladies and Gentlemen, Currently, transformations of the world unseen in a century are unfolding at a faster pace. Confronted with drastic external changes, we will conscientiously implement the guiding principles of the Political Bureau meeting of the CPC Central Committee held on April 25, committing ourselves to both goal-oriented and problem-oriented approaches, staying attuned to market demand, and rolling out a basket of supportive policies to keep employment stable, sustain business operations, maintain market stability, and anchor the expectations. Firstly, we will support foreign trade enterprises through multiple policy measures. We will further deepen the reform of trade-related foreign exchange management by launching a suite of facilitating policies. For example, we will launch high-level opening-up pilot programs for expanding cross-border trade, encourage banks to include more trade-related entities in emerging industries into the targets of facilitating policy support, optimize foreign exchange fund settlements for comprehensive foreign trade service providers, and facilitate the centralized overseas fund management for trustworthy engineering contracting firms. These policies are designed to support the innovation and development in trade. Secondly, we will proactively facilitate cross-border investment and financing. We will implement a facilitating policy mix to better support the international economic and trading cooperation and exchange of personnel. For example, we will support research institutions across the country in attracting and leveraging foreign capital, further facilitate the cross-border financing and investment of technology-based companies, and shorten the negative list for the use of income generated under the capital account. We will promote nationwide the integrated RMB and foreign currency cash pooling program for multinational corporations, to facilitate the centralized use of fund within the corporate group. Through the pilot program for green foreign debt policies, we will encourage eligible enterprises to borrow foreign debts for green projects. Meanwhile, we will improve the fund management of domestic enterprises that list abroad by harmonizing the policies for domestic and foreign currency management, thereby facilitating the repatriation and domestic use of fund raised overseas. In the coming future, a batch of investment quotas under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme will be issued, to meet the reasonable overseas investment demand by domestic entities in an orderly manner. Thirdly, we will implement a package of innovative policies related to foreign exchange businesses in the pilot free trade zones, to actively support the strategy of upgrading the pilot free trade zones. The policy package includes measures such as optimizing settlement processes for new international trade forms, and expanding the pilot program for Qualified Foreign Limited Partnerships (QFLP), among a total of ten facilitating policies. Ladies and Gentlemen, Accelerating the construction of Shanghai as an international financial center is a major strategic decision made by the CPC Central Committee. It holds special significance in serving the new development paradigm and promoting high-quality economic growth. In recent years, remarkable progress has been made in developing Shanghai as an international financial center. Today, Shanghai has evolved into a city with the most comprehensive financial market system, the most diverse range of financial institutions, and the highest level of financial opening-up in China. Since the beginning of this year, we have continued to step up support for building Shanghai into an international financial center. Not long ago, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA), the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government jointly released the Action Plan for Further Facilitating Cross-Border Financial Services in Shanghai International Financial Center. Recently, the PBOC and the SAFE approved the plan for upgrading the functions of Free Trade Accounts (FTAs) in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone and the pilot plan for comprehensive reform of offshore trade financial services in the Lin-gang Special Area. Moving forward, we will continue to strengthen the provision of high-quality policies and services to support entities of all types in participating in international competition and cooperation in a safer, more convenient, and more efficient manner. This will further enhance the competitiveness and global influence of Shanghai as an international financial center. To conclude, I wish the Forum a full success! Thank you! 2025-06-18/en/2025/0618/2310.html
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Distinguished Party Secretary Chen Jining, Former PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, Mayor Gong Zheng, Deputy Director Wang Jiang, Governor Pan Gongsheng, Minister Li Yunze, Chairman Wu Qing, Vice Minister Hu Haifeng, and dear guests, Good morning! It’s a great pleasure to join you at the Lujiazui Forum. I would like to take this opportunity to exchange some ideas with you on firmly advancing in-depth reforms and high-level opening-up in the foreign exchange sector, with a view to better supporting high-quality economic development. Since April, the international economic and trade order has faced severe disruptions, and global financial markets have experienced significant volatility. Under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, China has strengthened counter-cyclical adjustments to macroeconomic policies, effectively responding to external shocks. As a result, the foreign exchange market has remained generally stable despite the complex and challenging environment. Since the beginning of this year, the RMB exchange rate has moved in both directions with enhanced flexibility. The RMB exchange rate has appreciated by 1.6 percent against the US dollar and remained generally stable against a basket of currencies. China’s foreign trade has demonstrated strong resilience, with the current account surplus staying within a reasonable and balanced range. Cross-border investment has become more active, with net increase in domestic bonds holdings by overseas investors at a relatively high level, and foreign buying of domestic equities increasing recently. Looking ahead, China’s foreign exchange market remains well-positioned to maintain overall stability. First, China’s economy is expected to maintain its recovery and growth momentum. China is stepping up the implementation of more proactive and effective macroeconomic policies, placing greater strategic emphasis on expanding domestic demand and strengthening the domestic economic circulation, while also fostering and scaling up new quality productive forces. These efforts will strongly support steady and sound economic growth. Recently, multiple international organizations and investment banks have raised their growth forecasts for China in 2025. Second, the balance of payments will maintain a basic equilibrium. China remains unwavering in its commitment to opening-up, with strengthened policy measures to stabilize foreign trade and investment, and a steady expansion of financial market access. These factors will help foster more balanced cross-border capital flows. Third, China’s foreign exchange market will become more resilient. Market participants have become more mature and rational, with the proportion of corporate foreign exchange hedging and the share of RMB cross-border settlements in goods trade both rising to around 30 percent, significantly enhancing their ability to cope with exchange rate fluctuations. In recent years, we have also accumulated rich experience in managing various risks. Despite continued uncertainties and instabilities in the external environment, we have both the capability and confidence to maintain the sound operation of the foreign exchange market and keep the RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, thereby creating a favorable environment for high-quality economic development. Ladies and gentlemen, General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of staying committed to running our own affairs well and steadfastly expanding high-level opening-up, so as to counter the uncertainties of a rapidly changing external environment with the certainties of high-quality development. We will strike a balance between development and security, continue to deepen reform and opening-up in the foreign exchange sector, and promote the modernization of the foreign exchange governance system and governance capacity. Efforts will be made to build a sound foreign exchange management system featuring "greater convenience, expanded opening-up, enhanced security, and upgraded intelligence". We will unswervingly pursue a path of financial development with Chinese characteristics, thus providing stronger foreign exchange support for China’s high-quality economic development. First, in terms of "greater convenience", we will continue to improve a foreign exchange policy system that rewards integrity with greater access, and proactively enhance the quality and efficiency of foreign exchange services for the real economy. We will step up reform and innovation in foreign exchange management, and grant greater convenience to entities with strong records of compliance and integrity, thus further facilitating the cross-border trade, investment and financing. Firstly, we will focus on sci-tech enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to make significant efforts in the areas of technology finance, green finance, inclusive finance, old-age finance and digital finance. Also, we will actively support the development of new quality productive forces, and provide comprehensive foreign exchange services along the entire chain for major national strategies, key areas, and weak links. Secondly, we will steadily advance reform of bank foreign exchange operations by comprehensively optimizing the management framework for pre-transaction due diligence, differentiated review during transactions, and post-transaction monitoring and reporting, thereby achieving a better balance between improving efficiency and managing risks. Thirdly, we will establish a policy evaluation mechanism and an ecosystem assessment mechanism for foreign exchange management. Taking alignment with national strategic goals, consistency with local development realities, and the tangible benefits delivered to enterprises and the public as key criteria, we will continuously boost the real impact of policies to ensure that people and businesses gain a stronger sense of fulfillment. Second, in terms of “expanded opening-up”, we will promote high-level institutional opening-up in the foreign exchange sector to support the development of a new system for a higher-standard open economy. We will strengthen the overall planning and systematic integration of reforms, promoting RMB internationalization and the high-quality opening-up of the capital account in a coordinated manner. In addition, we will enhance the integrated management of domestic and foreign currencies, thus fostering a world-class business environment that is market-oriented, law-based, and internationalized. Firstly, we will deepen the reform of foreign exchange managements for direct investment, streamline the foreign exchange registration process for foreign direct investment (FDI), and shorten the negative list for fund use, so as to steadily support enterprises in participating in international cooperation across industrial and supply chains. Secondly, we will prudently and steadily expand the connectivity of financial markets, and refine the qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII/RQFII) program, thus facilitating foreign financial institutions in investing and operating in China. Thirdly, we will advance the reform of foreign debt management by optimizing quota management, shortening the “negative list” for the fund use of external debts, and gradually shifting the business of foreign debt registration to banks in an orderly manner. Fourthly, we will deepen the development and opening-up of the foreign exchange market, improve the product system, expand the range of market participants, and continue to enhance services for enterprises in managing exchange rate risks. Fifthly, we will support region-specific opening-up and development, explore integrated reform and innovation of foreign exchange management policies in pilot free trade zones, and actively support the development of key regions such as the Hainan Free Trade Port and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Third, regarding "enhanced security", we will strengthen the dual management framework of "macro-prudential plus micro-regulation" in the foreign exchange market to safeguard its stability and ensure national economic and financial security. Adhering to a bottom-line thinking, we will enhance open regulatory capabilities and risk prevention measures, fostering a positive interaction between high-quality development and high-level security. Firstly, we will mitigate risks rising from external shocks. We will intensify monitoring and early warning mechanisms for cross-border capital flows, strengthen macro-prudential management and expectation guidance, and maintain the RMB exchange rate at an adaptive and equilibrium level while ensuring a balanced international payments. Secondly, we will strengthen oversight in foreign exchange. We will advance the shift to entity-based regulatory approaches in the foreign exchange sector, crack down on illegal activities with heightened enforcement, and improve our capacity to identify and combat emerging criminal and illegal activities. Fourth, in "upgraded intelligence", we will leverage advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data to elevate the digital and intelligent capabilities of foreign exchange regulation. Through the development of "Smart Foreign Exchange Administration", we will provide more intelligent, efficient, secure, and user-friendly services to individuals and businesses. Simultaneously, we will enhance the intelligence, precision, and effectiveness of risk identification and regulatory oversight, empowering foreign exchange regulation with cutting-edge technological solutions. Ladies and Gentlemen, Currently, transformations of the world unseen in a century are unfolding at a faster pace. Confronted with drastic external changes, we will conscientiously implement the guiding principles of the Political Bureau meeting of the CPC Central Committee held on April 25, committing ourselves to both goal-oriented and problem-oriented approaches, staying attuned to market demand, and rolling out a basket of supportive policies to keep employment stable, sustain business operations, maintain market stability, and anchor the expectations. Firstly, we will support foreign trade enterprises through multiple policy measures. We will further deepen the reform of trade-related foreign exchange management by launching a suite of facilitating policies. For example, we will launch high-level opening-up pilot programs for expanding cross-border trade, encourage banks to include more trade-related entities in emerging industries into the targets of facilitating policy support, optimize foreign exchange fund settlements for comprehensive foreign trade service providers, and facilitate the centralized overseas fund management for trustworthy engineering contracting firms. These policies are designed to support the innovation and development in trade. Secondly, we will proactively facilitate cross-border investment and financing. We will implement a facilitating policy mix to better support the international economic and trading cooperation and exchange of personnel. For example, we will support research institutions across the country in attracting and leveraging foreign capital, further facilitate the cross-border financing and investment of technology-based companies, and shorten the negative list for the use of income generated under the capital account. We will promote nationwide the integrated RMB and foreign currency cash pooling program for multinational corporations, to facilitate the centralized use of fund within the corporate group. Through the pilot program for green foreign debt policies, we will encourage eligible enterprises to borrow foreign debts for green projects. Meanwhile, we will improve the fund management of domestic enterprises that list abroad by harmonizing the policies for domestic and foreign currency management, thereby facilitating the repatriation and domestic use of fund raised overseas. In the coming future, a batch of investment quotas under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme will be issued, to meet the reasonable overseas investment demand by domestic entities in an orderly manner. Thirdly, we will implement a package of innovative policies related to foreign exchange businesses in the pilot free trade zones, to actively support the strategy of upgrading the pilot free trade zones. The policy package includes measures such as optimizing settlement processes for new international trade forms, and expanding the pilot program for Qualified Foreign Limited Partnerships (QFLP), among a total of ten facilitating policies. Ladies and Gentlemen, Accelerating the construction of Shanghai as an international financial center is a major strategic decision made by the CPC Central Committee. It holds special significance in serving the new development paradigm and promoting high-quality economic growth. In recent years, remarkable progress has been made in developing Shanghai as an international financial center. Today, Shanghai has evolved into a city with the most comprehensive financial market system, the most diverse range of financial institutions, and the highest level of financial opening-up in China. Since the beginning of this year, we have continued to step up support for building Shanghai into an international financial center. Not long ago, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA), the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government jointly released the Action Plan for Further Facilitating Cross-Border Financial Services in Shanghai International Financial Center. Recently, the PBOC and the SAFE approved the plan for upgrading the functions of Free Trade Accounts (FTAs) in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone and the pilot plan for comprehensive reform of offshore trade financial services in the Lin-gang Special Area. Moving forward, we will continue to strengthen the provision of high-quality policies and services to support entities of all types in participating in international competition and cooperation in a safer, more convenient, and more efficient manner. This will further enhance the competitiveness and global influence of Shanghai as an international financial center. To conclude, I wish the Forum a full success! Thank you! 2025-06-18/en/2025/0618/2311.html